



HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
IRANIAN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

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Narrator: Dr. Kamran Kashani

Date: July 22, 1982

Place: Mykonos, Greece

Interviewer: Habib Ladjevardi

Tape No: 1

This is a recording for Harvard's Iranian Oral History Project. The narrator is Dr. Kamran Kashani, formerly Associate Professor at Iran Center for Management Studies and now at IMEDE in Leusanne, Switzerland. Today is July 22, 1982, and we are in Mykonos, Greece.

Q. Well, I think it would be interesting to start our session today by asking you to describe the events that really brought the beginnings of the Iranian revolution to ICMS. And then I think as we talk other issues will come up which we will discuss.

A. Okay, if you recall, I was away from ICMS during the fall of 1978. I was in the States working for Continental Can. I left right after the famous Black Friday, and arrived just before (let's see) it was still during the martial law, but

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it was toward the end of the martial law. So I missed about two months of this beginning of the year, academic year -- I was not there, for example.

Actually, it took a fairly long time before the beginnings of the Iranian revolution effected ICMS -- in the sense that the life around ICMS was normal. Needless to say, everybody was concerned, interested, apprehensive about what was going on outside. We had daily reports of where the incidents were taking place -- <in> which streets, which sections of the city were demonstrations. We never heard any shots from ICMS, because ICMS was fairly removed from the center of the city. Nevertheless, when our messengers would come back, they would bring back news like where was what happening.

On occasions, the faculty would go (some members of the faculty, Iranian faculty) and visit -- not participate, but observe what was going on. Farhad <Simiyar>, for example, was a case in point. He would drive his car right into the demonstrations and he would actually hear and ... hear the shots. He even mentioned once that he was so close to the soldiers firing that some of the empty bullets would sort of hit his car. And he would, of course, come back with all kinds of stories about what was going on.

I was, myself, doing some case research, case studies, and I was caught in the middle of a demonstration, right around

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Eisenhower Street. But as far as the workers were concerned, there was no ... nothing really happening.

Q. The workers of the school?

A. Workers of the school. Life was as usual. The students were going to classes, and although everything else was closed, we tried to keep this a well-kept secret because we didn't want to stand out as the only institution still continuing business as usual, when everything else was shut down in support of the revolution.

There was, as one might expect, discussions, sometimes heated discussion, among the faculty, about the turn of the events and its direction, where the movement was leading. On the Iranian faculty side, there was a ... I guess the majority for the revolution, or the ideals of the revolution, at least. Of the non-Iranian faculty, towards the end the only ones left were, of course, J.B. <Kassarjian> and Jim <Baughman>, who took a different point of view towards the direction of the movements and the

The students would be attending classes. There was not much of a sympathy for what was going on, except for lunch time kind of discussions of ... at least it wasn't observed, I could not observe any overt sympathy for what was going on -- which was a contrast to the second year, when there was a lot

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of fire and heat and so forth in the classroom for what had just taken place, the revolution. But the year before, 1978-79, I couldn't really say there was much overt support.

Q. Then you began having shorter ... the strikes began to affect the school....

A. That's right. The only tangible ways the school was affected was lack of gasoline for transportation to and from the school. Interesting enough, the secretaries, who had their own car pool, were not affected by this. Somehow they managed ... these agencies managed to get their cars in the line and get enough gasoline. But the faculty and the workers -- some of the workers -- who had to come with their own private cars from a distance, they were affected. I, for one, took Well, let's see, I had some left ... I had two cars, so I was using both cars, and I had some help from people who would take my car and put it in line. But I guess others, especially the foreign faculty, were more affected than I was.

I managed ... ICMS managed to get a sizeable supply of gasoline finally, so much so that we were told we had to take it because it was dangerous to have a tankful, a large tankful of gasoline lying around the school. But it came through our connections with the NIOC.

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Q. Some of our students?

A. Yes, I believe so. Yes, I think so. That was one way that our school was affected. The blackout was another one. The question was ... there was something like three or four hours every night -- blackout. And it had become fairly well regulated; you knew what time exactly the blackouts would occur and usually they occurred right after the BBC broadcasting of Farzai, to which everybody listened.

Q. Somebody wanted to make sure that the BBC was listened to.

A. I guess so, yes. And the problem there was that the students were complaining about lack of reading light, because they were saying they didn't have enough adequate lighting for reading our long cases. So we managed to get some battery-operated fluorescent lights -- one per court, which was not adequate, but still it satisfied some of their immediate concerns of at least being able to understand what the case was all about. Some people were saying that they slept during this time and woke up after the lights came back and started reading. It was very difficult, I guess, for the students -- more so than the faculty.

Q. Were class discussions affected?

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A. Not appreciably.

Q. The quality?

A. No, no, I would say not. It was not all that much affected.

The heating was another question. We needed a lot of heating oil, fuel, which was very scarce, if you remember, during that time. And even though we had still our share of ... our special share from a very limited supply -- through, again, our friends -- it still was not adequate. So we kept that ... we kept the temperatures low and then we turned it off during certain hours of the night. We had to make some makeshift arrangements for some offices to be heated, some buildings to be heated, some buildings not to be heated.

Q. Jim Baughman, I heard, had a lot to do with this -- these regulations.

A. Yes. He took charge of worrying about the details such as lighting and heating and so forth. For example, he started the fireplace in one of the lounges next to the restaurant, and he arranged for a lot of wood to be carved up and brought over. He even started the fireplace himself. And at the first trial, there was a lot of smoke coming into the room, and then he went up and found that the whole

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chimney had been blocked by somebody who didn't want the rain-water to drip in. So he opened the top of the chimney and it worked.

We bought also some portable electric heaters -- like everybody else in the city, who had turned from central heating to portable heating arrangements, because central heating would require some fuel whereas electrical was just ... you just plugged it in. So we had those around the classrooms. There was some argument, questions as to where the limited number of these heaters should be, and we often came to the secretaries' working area, because that was usually the place where it was best heated. It didn't have too much contact with the outside -- no windows and so forth -- so it was well heated. And sometimes we worked there.

Again, prior to the revolution, these were the only minor ways that the school was affected. We carried on. We made sure that everybody understood that if people heard about our continuing work, we might be forced to stop. And people kept that secret very well.

Q. So the point was that all the other schools and universities and everything -- they were all closed?

A. Well, they were open but there were no classes being held. Open for all kinds of political activities. ICMS

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wasn't.

Q. So let's go to, let's say, the time of the revolution or the days preceding it, whenever seems like a more appropriate time to discuss your, sort of, memories of how the revolution occurred.

A. I think it would be appropriate to move forward to the time when it was clear that the revolution was going to succeed. The Shah had left the country. Bakhtiar was having all kinds of problems. There were bloody riots in and around the university -- demonstrations, I should say.

The question was how should the faculty deal with this thing. I guess we ... I don't recall very well, but I think we had a meeting on this: shall we continue or ... given the current, very critical situations, shall we continue or shall we stop, like everyone else, and see what happens? Because it was getting to be very difficult towards the end. I mean, our limited shortage <supply> of gasoline, our limited shortage <supply> of fuel was just being depleted. But I think the faculty decided that we should carry on.

Then there was the question of how should the American faculty, those who wanted to leave ... how they could leave. I don't recall the name of the chap who was in marketing

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Q. ???

A. Yes, yes. That's right. He was one of the first to opt for departure. Who else was there at the time? Larry perhaps? Was Larry there? I think he was there.

Q. Larry Steadman?

A. Yes, I think he was there. Yes, he left.

Q. This happened before the revolution?

A. This is before the revolution. This was at the time Americans were evacuating from Iran.

Q. I see.

A. Because almost to the end, the Americans were saying that things were as normal -- I guess they wanted to give Bakhtiar a chance, by A full evacuation would have meant that they were losing hope.

If I recall, Jim Baughman had a number of meetings with at least two -- maybe more -- with the remaining members of the board of trustees. <Hossein-Ali> Soudevar I think was one. There was another one, I cannot....

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Q. <G. Reza> Moghadam, I think was still....

A. Moghadam perhaps was the other one. And he would check with them the situation, the He would try to figure out what was really going on outside, what was the effect.

Q. What was the effect of the board of trustees not being there? Was there any discussion about it? What were the feelings about it?

A. Well, actually it was, I think, Jim Baughman who brought to our attention that very few members of the board were actually left in Iran. It was, again, towards the end of this difficult period preceding the actual revolution, those two or three days of the revolution. And he said that he needed support the most at that time, to understand what was going on, to see the appropriate course the school should take in confronting the changes that were taking place or were about to take place. And he found himself abandoned. And he mentioned that a number of times.

And I think, in a way, he was sincere in his expression of being left alone. I think he really did need advice at the time. He had only been there -- what? -- no more than nine months. So this whole thing was a very uncalled-for intrusion into what he had set up to do. And in the faculty meetings he brought that topic up a number of times. He was,

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in a way, saying that, "Basically this is it. We are all in the same boat and we should make our own decisions, because there's nobody else up there to help us through this."

But interesting enough, he was a rather isolated person himself; he would not talk to many people. I think that's his personal style. And although he ... I guess deep down he wanted to know what was going on; but he would not sit down and talk to any one of us individually. Only in faculty meetings were these issues or these questions, or these concerns brought up by him.

J.B. had decided to stay on -- through the year, at least through the year. He didn't really see any immediate personal danger. Everybody else left, those who could leave.

Q. So who were the faculty members who were there now? There was Jim Beughman, there was Kassarjian, yourself?

A. <J.B.> Kassarjian, myself, Farshad Rafii, Kamai Aragheyd, Siemak Movahedi, Farhad Simiyar....

Q. Kasra Ferdows?

A. Yes, Kasra Ferdows and Rostam....

Q. Rostam?

A. Kevoussi. Basically, these were....

In fact, if the faculty had been more like the first couple of years of the school -- the first even three or four years of the school, when the majority of the faculty were American and there were areas where Iranians were not represented, then I think the school would have ~~had~~ to close. But we ... from the school's point of view, and perhaps from the point of view of the people who were ~~there~~ then, they were very lucky that they taught the year through.

Okay, the revolution.... Now, we could have missed a day or two during the heat of the last few days of the revolution, when the barracks were attacked and.... I can't recall now, maybe we could have missed one or two days. But that would have been the maximum.

Q. Missed classes?

A. Missed classes. Because of the very unusual situation outside.

Q. So far there was no particular sentiment from the workers or any students...?

A. No. At least it wasn't....

Q. Attacking the school or the administration?

A. It wasn't overt. If there was any, it wasn't overt. I recall one conversation where ... who was the fellow who -- the librarian, not librarian, but...?

Q. Heidari.

A. Heidari, who was a messenger, who claimed that because of his back he couldn't do the runs downtown and back anymore. So, Shapour <Chane'> put him as the guard to the library. Actually, they created that job for him. I heard this conversation that somebody was saying that, "Maybe this revolution is going to be for the better." And this fellow, who later turned out to be a very fiery brand of revolutionary -- of course, after the revolution succeeded -- he started saying that, "No, this is.... Let's not rock the boat. The Shah was good to us, the workers. Without him, it's not clear what's going to happen to us." And so forth.

I mean, I just would say it was normal. There was not an overt or open support for the revolution, either from the workers or from the students. During those days ... I think it was the second day when the barracks were cleaned up by the people who had attacked them, I think our messenger was downtown doing something. He saw a crowd, he joined the

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crowd and went into a ... I think it was Jamshidiyeh barracks, walked away with a very serious-looking submachine gun. And he just brought that one back as a souvenir to the school, as a sign of the revolution. You know, he was one of several thousands of people who had picked up something here and there from these barracks. And he was the only one who brought something back. Yes, I think he was the only one. There might have been one other person, but we didn't see his gun.

This -- his gun -- he brought it back and started showing it to people. Jim Baughman happened to be there at the time. And since he knows guns and he can tell real guns from fake ones, he came down and examined that one, and it looked pretty real to him. Later, he said that he was very scared of that scene, because this man, who didn't know the tail of the gun from its barrel, was holding it very casually. And it turned out later on that there was a bullet still in the machine-gun.

And according to him again, that was the moment he made up his mind to leave. Because he noticed that he had no control of the messenger because of the turn of events. He might put himself in personal jeopardy if he had actually ordered the messenger to take the gun away from the school. And feeling that, that he was still the president and he couldn't do that -- such a simple thing -- he decided that maybe it was time

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for him to leave with the rest of the Americans. And he felt rather uncomfortable telling the faculty about his decision.

His wife had left him about two or three weeks earlier, during the American evacuation ... earlier American evacuation. And in his letter of resignation, which he read to the faculty, he mentioned, I think, this fact, and the fact that he was left alone, and he was ... his job -- the way it was described to him -- looked very different now than it was supposed to be. Because he did not have the full support of the board of trustees, members of the board of trustees. And he also felt that maybe it was for the best, if he left -- as an American he would leave the school as its head. He made that decision very quickly, right after the (I think it was the) 22nd of Bahman. In a day or two after that, he left. He packed up and left. He left so quickly that few of us got to say goodbye to him -- I didn't, for example.

Q. So what did you people do ... in a school without a president?

A. Let's see. We turned to Kasra (Ferdows). Kasra seemed to be the most obvious candidate to take up the leadership. He was the most senior Iranian; he had been around the school the longest. Anyway, we felt that he had enough of the leadership skills to see the year through and ... God knows

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what's going to happen the following year. Because our concerns were very immediate.

I think we had a discussion with him. At first he refused, because he felt he was taking on too much of a responsibility that he was not sure he could fulfill. But then we made the point to him that there was really nobody else who could ... who had more qualifications. So, grudgingly, he had accepted the job. He called himself the "chairman of the faculty council" as opposed to the "president". In a way we created that job ... in a way we created that responsibility because previously the president was also the chairman of the faculty council. Now, the chairman of the faculty council had the president's responsibility minus the title, because we felt the presidency required, perhaps, a wider consensus, and he was acting as a member of the faculty and not as the president. So he took on the job, and at the time there were not too many things that needed to be ... too many decisions that needed to be made. The oil supply....

Q. Was the faculty fairly unanimous on this decision or was there such conflict?

A. No, I think ... no, I think the faculty was pretty unanimous. I think so. At least, I didn't sense any.... We were really faced with very few options, I mean we didn't have many options.

This fellow -- I don't recall his name but he was the deputy minister of higher education. So we had our first meeting. We went there and introduced ourselves. He said, "Oh, yes. You're from that Harvard school." We said ... well, we explained to him our association, or lack of it, with Harvard. And then he asked the question, "Wasn't that the school the Ladjevardis were involved <with>?" And we again explained the relationship between....

Q. Was it the family he meant, or...?

A. Family. Yes, I think so. I think in relation to the family. So we mentioned that only one member of the family was involved, and he was not even around, and hadn't been around, and his involvement was only an honorary one. He was not benefitting from the school in any sort of way -- personally, at least.

So, that was sort of an introduction, it was a very difficult introduction.

Q. It was time to cut some old ties ... in order to survive.

A. Exactly. We had to dissociate ourselves from our immediate past and build on our strengths, which we felt were that we were training managers at a time when Iran needs

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manager, and the fact that some of our alumni were in rather prominent positions immediately after the revolution.

Q. Which ones? Gavahi?

A. Gavahi was one. He was, at the time, spokesman or deputy to ... assistant to the prime minister, Bazargan. His colleague, also, who is now in Iraq....

Q. Boushehri.

A. Boushehri ... had been appointed to some very high position in the Oil Ministry.

There were others -- I can't recall their names. There were others too who had ... whom we knew were with the revolution and were participating actively in the organization of the revolution, and who had immediately grabbed or been given some jobs and some positions. Needless to say, he was not very impressed....

Q. The deputy minister?

A. The deputy minister. And since we didn't want to raise any thorny issues with him at our first meeting, we just felt that that difficult introduction was enough for the first round and we came out feeling rather bewildered, and really

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not feeling very good about that meeting. Because that was the first taste of what was going to come: that we had no legitimacy whatsoever, and we had to start from scratch building a body of people who would explain us to the rest of the new community.

I think that was the only meeting we had. We sent letters, we congratulated Mr. Bazargan for the revolution -- as a faculty body we did. I think that our congratulations were, at the time, very sincere. Most of us, at least, we felt very good about what had happened -- this is, you know, I'm going back in time, this is like....

Q. February, March?

A. Yes. A month after the revolution. This other meeting took place later -- early summer.

But nobody really came to knock on our door. The fact that we were small, I think, really helped. Because all the other schools were given a new chancellor and a new man to head, and a new this and a new that. But our school wasn't really.... I mean we made decisions -- that would have taken three levels of hierarchies in the Ministry of Education to make -- ourselves. We were small enough to be able to do that. For example....

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Q. Who signed the diplomas? Normally it would be the president and the minister.

A. All right. The diplomas we sent out again through the same channel, and were told that we needed a little bit more push to make sure that they'd get signed. Because our year and the academic year were different. The new people who had to sign them were not aware of this thing, so the people who were expeditors told us, "If you really want to have your diplomas by the end of the year, well you have to just go and explain what's really going on."

It happened that this fellow, this man I was telling you about, was the one who was supposed to sign it, so we made a number of telephone calls to explain the situation. We may have even written a number of letters to him, too, to explain. And we may even have asked Rabimi to pull a few strings. But even a simple thing like that, signing of diplomas, because these people were new, required a great deal of effort, and we realized that it was not going to be easy. There were other more difficult decisions or requests, such as funding of the school, for example.

I should explain here that after Bazargan got established (this is two or three months later), he sent out a memorandum that all private schools are now government, so we considered ourselves a part of the new system. Without mentioning any

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names, there was just a categorical list: all private schools were no longer private. And that the new government order on salaries, limits on salaries, also applies to all universities, all colleges, schools -- private or not private.

So we had a dilemma, because the maximum salary as decided by the Bazargan cabinet was 20,000 ... or rather really 15,000 <tomans>, and in exceptional cases, with the approval of the cabinet, something like 20,000 tomans could be paid. So we took upon ourselves ... at ICMS, few people ... nobody was below 15,000, if I can recall, and the majority I think were either at 20,000 or above -- even the newly-hired faculty were at that level. So we took upon ourselves to start such things as faculty decrees, whereby <the> faculty council would sit and make decisions, and recommend the decisions to the chairman of the faculty (being Kasra Ferdows) and he would only carry them out.

So, we felt we were, in a way ... very fortunate that we could make these decisions ourselves without having to put up with somebody who is new from outside and hot on implementing the newly-decided government's initiatives and decrees. And that went on for a good nine months, this manner of the faculty running the school.

I think I should mention that even though Kasra was the

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chairman, he was sort of a replacement for Jim Baughman. During his months of tenure in that position, he never really took any decisions by himself. He always consulted the faculty. It was really faculty decisions that he implemented. So, we were running the show, the faculty was.

And we held our graduation intact, minus of course the military band.

Q. The music...?

A. But the music was there. The music was there.

Q. And who gave the diplomas? Normally it would be Prince Abdorreza.

A. Well, we had difficulty finding a prince, so we had to go for the next best. I'm trying to think who gave the diplomas, who made the speeches. Kasra made a very good speech. He wrote it himself (his Farsi was much better than we thought) and he wrote a very good speech. At the time, the pressure was being felt by the former supporters of the revolution, because some of their ideals had been betrayed -- right ... immediately almost -- so in the first six months there were quite a few disenchanted people, including Kasra. So in his speech, he managed to throw in a few pieces....

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He did say very nice things about the background of the school, about the people who helped make the school, and about the ideas of the school. And he also hoped that, in the new order, the school would be able to survive as an independent, non-government school dedicated to its former ideals of training the best managers ... that could run very complex organizations in Iran.

I'm trying to think who was the.... He may have given the only speech, as far as I know. I mean, we thought of inviting this and that. We thought of inviting Bazargan himself, but we felt Bazargan was under pressure, and we didn't want him to become immediately associated with the school. Although we felt he would appreciate what the school stood for. But then we didn't want to go too low -- below Bazargan -- to find somebody. I could be wrong, but I think the decision was made not to have anybody else, and Kasra was the only one who gave a speech. And, as usual, J.B. <Kassarjian> would read the names -- everything else was intact, basically.

Q. No speeches in English? Was the student oration ... was that given in English or Persian?

A. The student oration. I'm pretty sure it was given by an Iranian in Farsi, but I don't recall his face or his name. I'm pretty sure of that. It was a very Persian school, and

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even J.B., when he would call these names, would say "Agha-ye" <Mr.>, "Khanoum-eh" <Mrs./Miss>. It was a very Persian program, the graduation program.

Q. When did you begin visiting the ayatollahs and people to get support? Is this after Kasra had left, or was he still there?

A. No, when Kasra was there, we were thinking of ... because we knew he was going to leave, and in the meantime we were trying again to find out who might be a likely candidate to replace the whole board of trustees. Because it was clear that we couldn't ask for too many people, we wanted one person who would have enough clout, who would not be considered as a radical, who would understand what the school stood for, who would not try to victimize the faculty for whatever they didn't like about the former protectors of the school. In a way, we were looking for somebody who didn't exist, but we kept on looking. I think it became very clear that that person, that ideal person, did not exist.

I think we were carrying out the search. We had made some offers to people like Gavahi and Boushehri to be involved with the school, even bring their ... you know, set up an office in the school. We didn't know what title they would bear, but we wanted them in physical association with the school. But they declined, because at the time they had too

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many good offers to worry about, and ICMS was not one of them.

It was after we returned from our trip to Europe -- where we met and we sat around and we said that we want to make the school go, we want to keep the school -- we came back with the determination to go out and find somebody. We even managed to meet Bazargan, which was a very interesting meeting.

Q. This is after the summer, this is the fall of '79?

A. This is the fall of '79, early fall. Gavahi managed to arrange a meeting with Bazargan.

Q. In his office?

A. In his office. We went to the former prime minister's....

Q. It was in Hoveida's office?

A. No, it was down below. From what we understood, Hoveida's office, or all the previous prime ministers' offices, were on the second floor. This was on the first floor, in one of the offices that used to be held by one of Hoveida's deputies.

Q. What took place at this meeting?

A. Well, it was a very unceremonial meeting.

Q. Who were the participants?

A. I was there -- all the members of the faculty except for J.B. All the Iranian members of the faculty were there. But of course, we were headed, officially, by Kaara, who made the introduction. And Gavahi was there.

Q. Was Bazargan there alone or were there other officials?

A. Bazargan was alone. This meeting was in his room, took place in his room. He had a little corner desk, very small desk, nothing big, and we had a round table -- so there was no head and no tail to this table -- and he just sat there, again, very unceremoniously, but very ... congenial and very informal.

That meeting was most interesting. Kaara was making an introduction about the school, <the> background of the school. He <Bazargan> might have known about the school, but he just said, "Let's go over the good points about the school, the strength of the school." And you know, we had quite a few. Gavahi was sitting there as a first-year

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alumnus of the school. We really didn't have to overdo it; we just went down the list.

While he was making the speech, Gavahi -- I didn't see this, but some of the others did, including Farhad Simiyar -- wrote down on a piece of paper something, and apparently passed it to Hoveida -- Bazargan. Bazargan looks at it -- since there were only two or three letters apparently -- and he just puts it on the table. At that moment, Farhad Simiyar can now see what was written on that piece of paper and it said, "Aghy-e Ferdows baha'i hastand <Mr. Ferdows is a Baha'i>." Of course, it had nothing to do with the meeting.

The meeting went very well. I mean, it's a credit to the man who didn't let that small, minor point, which had nothing to do with anything, to distract him -- apparently it distracted Gavahi so much that he had to inform the man -- but he went on and we didn't see any ... and we just....

He was very helpful. He understood the predicament of the school. He also understood how little he could do about ICMS. He said, "Well...." We explained to him that we are under pressure, increasing pressure to change our curriculum, to change our language, to change even our name. He says -- immediately grabbed there -- and says, "Okay, instead of saying 'Iran Center for Management Studies', write 'Iran Center for Islamic Management Studies'. That will do it,

will satisfy these mullahs."

Q. That's what he said?

A. That's what he said. And he even told us an anecdote about the mullahs. He made it very clear that he was on our side of the camp; he just didn't leave any room for doubt. Right after a comment that was made about the pressure from outside, he says, "Well, these mullahs, you know, what do they understand about management? I mean, take their turbans. Every class of whatnot has had, in the history, a hat, a crown, to protect, to do this, do that, their heads. But they all had a system, a shape, a form which was logical, which was understandable. And then look at ... think of the mullahs, think of how mixed up and how mangled, how ill-formed their turban is." And he said, "That's how they are. They don't understand systems, they don't understand management." So he was definitely on our side.

We offered to him, and in a way we had to, we said, "We know you are a very busy man, <but> we want you to look after ICMS." He said he would do it any time, but he wasn't sure, first of all, that it was good for ICMS if he was personally associated with the school. Remember, this is after about nine months, maybe more, that he had become prime minister, and he was under a lot of pressure. Later we discovered that, or we were told, that he had offered his resignation,

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by that time, several times to Khomeini.

Q. This was only a few months or a few weeks before the hostage ... takeover of the embassy.

A. A few months before. Exactly. The hostages were taken in October?

Q. November.

A. Okay, this meeting must have taken place in ... yes, a few weeks before that.

Q. But he said he would do anything he can, as an interested member of the government. He said that he would advise us not to change our language, keep it English, because he couldn't understand how managers could be real managers in today's international environment without knowing a second language. He said, "Keep it. Don't let that pressure...." And he basically was very supportive, even though at the end of the meeting we looked at ourselves and said, "Okay. What are we coming out with except with a lot of good feelings -- about ourselves, about this man?" And we said we hoped to meet him again. He offered ... he said fine, he would meet us. Again, he gave us a few anecdotes about his days in the prison -- with Taleghani.

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Q. Do you remember those?

A. Yes. He said ... again back on this idea of his that the mullahs never understood any system, that they were not good managers. He said that in prison, he and Taleghani apparently were sharing the same cell. And he said he couldn't have seen a worse mess than Taleghani's bed. It was always a mess -- you couldn't tell where his head was or his tail was. And he would ... when he would wake up, it was all just pushed, all his mattress and everything to one corner of the room, ~~he would~~ just push it. And then when he was about to sleep, just spread everything out in the middle of the room and sleep on it.

Of course, he had a lot of respect for Taleghani as a man and....

Q. Who had died by that time.

A. I think so, yes, he had died. He died a few months after the revolution.

But in retrospect, it was very clear that he was under a lot of pressure from the mullahs, and he was seeing them as his real enemies, not the other revolutionaries, not the other people who had their own axes to grind.

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Q. This act by Gavahi, did this fit anything that he had done previously or anything that he did subsequently?

A. Not at all. Not at all.

Q. Does it seem sort of out of character? Could there have been a mistake?

A. It does. When we came out, Farhad had to say this to a few of us, and then he went and apologized to Kasra. But he said, "I have to tell you this, because I think if you don't know what happened at that meeting, you would be misled by some future meetings with Gavahi." So, Kasra, when he heard that, he just.... First of all, his colors changed, he was so furious -- and yet Kasra is a very calm person, a very controlled person -- he had difficulty handling himself for a good five to fifteen minutes. He just didn't understand it. Really, none of us understood it. We just didn't know what was going on. We had our theories that he <Gavahi> wanted to feel especially close to Bazargan, wanted to give him the tips that few other people knew. Even up to today, I don't understand why he said it, why he did it.

Q. Did anybody ever ask Gavahi later, as far as you know?

A. No.

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Q. Of course, for the record, Kassra states that he is not a Bahai.

A. And I believe him. After that meeting ... it was interesting, because we were still right in the courtyard of this thing, and he felt that he had to say this....

Q. The prime minister's courtyard?

A. The prime minister's courtyard, in the front. We were just standing there, talking about this, and he says, "Only my uncle, my father's brother, is a Bahai. And that is as close as I can get to a Bahai. But everywhere I go, they say Ferdows...." Apparently his uncle was a big Bahai, was an organizer, so people knew him, so they associated him and his father with that crowd.

Q. Do you think this event had much to do with Kassra's decision to leave?

A. No, he had made the decision beforehand. See, we had a retreat in the spring.

Q. The spring of '79?

A. '79. To go and pull our heads together, and see....

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Q. Where was that held?

A. At the same place where we had held the last one, where you were there.

Q. Ghajereh?

A. No, it wasn't Ghajereh, it was Shemshak.

Q. Shemshak.

A. It was a very good meeting, because we brought our booze along, and....

Q. It wasn't very dangerous?

A. At the time it wasn't dangerous. I mean, it was.... We knew we would be caught and might be fined -- not fined -- but we might be even flogged, given a few lashes. But, at the time it was not a very serious crime. So, Siemak <Movahedi> brought a very good homemade aregh <local vodka>, that we could taste the kashmesh <grape> out of it. Anyway....

There he announced that he was going to leave, that he had made up his mind. That it was not going to be a good, healthy place for his family. He was more concerned

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about.... He said if he wasn't married, he would stay and stick it out with the rest of us, but because of his family, he felt that he owed it to his child, and....

Q. So when di' you people start visiting these ayatollahs?

A. It was after.... Actually, nothing was really done while Kasra was there. We had discussed candidates, but Kasra left soon after that meeting with the prime minister. So, all along I hear that Zandieh is a big shot, so I have him on my own personal list, because I did happen to have a good relationship with him before he left ICMS. So he was on my personal list of people.... All along we were hearing that Zandieh was getting recognition in the new system. And in one of the meetings I held, or we had -- I think I had -- with him, he said, "I would recommend to you this Ayatollah Ghafouri, Golzadeh Ghafouri."

Q. Golzadeh?

A. Golzadeh Ghafouri. He said, "He is a good man. He is not a fanatic. And he would understand your point of view." So he said, "Why don't you go and talk to him?" At the time, I had not proposed to Zandieh to look after us. So, through Boushehri, who happened to know this ayatollah, we managed to get a time, one evening, to visit him.

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Q. Why don't we end today's discussion here, as the tape is running out. Next time we'll start with....

A. With the meeting with the ayatollah.



HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
IRANIAN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

DIRECTOR: HABIB LADJEVARDI
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NARRATOR: KAMRAN KASHANI

DATE OF INTERVIEW: JULY 24, 1982

PLACE OF INTERVIEW: MYKONOS, GREECE

INTERVIEWER: HABIB LADJEVARDI

TAPE No.: 2

RESTRICTIONS: NONE

82-10-87

1 OF 17 TAPE

NARRATOR: HABIB LADJEVARDI
TAP #: 82

BREWER, JAMES

BOURGEOIS, JEANNE

CLOTH, GOVERNMENT & THE

SAFETY, NATIONAL POLICE

SHAH, SAVITA

1988 CENTER FOR MANAGEMENT STUDIES

ADMIRALTY, SHIPS

AFGHAN, AFGHANISTAN

REVOLUTION OF 1979, LEVY EAGLESON IN

WOMEN

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

WOMEN

1980s, 1990s

82

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
IRANIAN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Narrator: Dr. Kamran Kashani

Date: July 24, 1982

Place: Mykonos, Greece

Interviewer: Habib Ladjevardi

Tape No: 2

A. Okay, maybe I should mention this as background, if I didn't earlier -- that we were planning to, we wanted to have our own hand-picked director for the school, because we observed that other schools were being given chancellors, and presidents, and directors from the top -- people who had no knowledge or familiarity with these schools. And we decided that our school was so special -- and so small -- that we probably could get away with someone that we proposed to the government. Someone who ... whom we had reached some understanding with.

So, in the process of search, we were given several names. One of them was Dr. Chamran, the brother of the then, I think, minister of defense and the other one was Golzadeh Ghafouri.

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Q. Who was giving these names?

A. These names came out through the process of interviewing, talking to the various alumnus of the school -- alumni of the school. People like Gavahi and Boushehri.

Q. At about this time, or even before this, weren't you organizing some sort of a managers' council or management group, or professional managers' organization or something?

A. I think we toyed with that idea. I think we toyed with the idea of replacing the entire board of trustees with a select group of professional managers -- post-revolutionary managers -- and then having the school run by the faculty, because we had experienced a rather harmonious working relationship while Karsa was heading the faculty council. So we thought, "Well, if we can get away with a system whereby we would have to report, not to a government body, but to a group of managers, who would also be approved by the government, then we would have the cake and eat it too." But that idea soon looked unfeasible. It didn't take very long to realize that that was not going to work.

So we were looking for one man, one person who would head the school, who would look after our interests, who would understand what we were all about, who would not try to mess up ICMS as we knew it. So we went after Dr. Chavran; we

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invited him. I'm not sure who was our contact. It could have been Gavahi, because at the time Chamran was also **(Persian)** **(an advisor to the prime minister).**

Q. Advisor to the prime minister.

A. Advisor to the prime minister. And so Gavahi and he were working in the same offices.

Q. What was his background?

A. He had a U.S. education. From what I understand, he also had an American wife. He had taught at Aryamehr -- Pahlavi I think for a while, and then Aryamehr. And maybe when Aryamehr was transferred down to Esfahan, he was there, but he came from Esfahan -- at least, this is what I remember -- he had spent some time in Esfahan.

A very reasonable man. We thought he would have been overall a good person to have. He didn't really know much about management, as one might expect.

Q. What was his...?

A. His background was in engineering. I don't recall what exact branch it was.

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Q. Were you interested in him because of himself as a person, or because he was a brother of Mostafa Chamran?

A. We were told that "He's a good guy." Okay, you have to remember that in those days we had "good guys" and "bad guys" -- bad guys being defined by people who were full of slogans, who would change direction depending on which way the wind was blowing, who were going to sacrifice the institution for their own well-being. And the good guys were defined ~~as~~ people who had some principles, who could understand the value of managerial education for the future of Iran, who would not be opposed to ICMS per se, would not try to use the past as a weapon to destroy it. So he would be classified in our book as a good guy.

Q. How important was his relation ... his being brother of an important person?

A. Well, needless to say, when first we heard "Chamran," the word "Chamran," we thought Dr. Chamran was the other Dr. Chamran. Then we were told that no, he is the minister's brother. I think we were counting on that. I think the faculty was counting that this relationship ... we would again have the best of the two worlds. We would have a "revolutionary" head, at the same time somebody who was not waving any red flags and was not going to make ICMS a springboard for the next job. Because we were concerned

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about this. We didn't want people who would come here for one year and then move on -- meanwhile do anything that would enhance their future position.

So we had lunch with him, with Dr. Chamran.

Q. At the school?

A. At the school. We showed him the school, we showed him around the school. He was impressed. He had heard about us, but he didn't know much about us. He confessed that he didn't really know much about management education. So when he left, we sensed that he was not going to jump for this position.

Q. You actually offered him the position?

A. Well, we, it was.... Yes, in a way we were, we were offering.... Well, we ... it was a.... We didn't offer the position to him. We were feeling him out. We were sending feelers, sort of expecting some response -- whether he would nibble at it or not. But basically...

Q. You were saying the job was available.

A. Well, we were basically saying that we were looking for somebody like you, who would understand the school, would

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promote the school. And then we would say, "Well we hope that you would consider us, as you look through your next responsibility in the government."

Q. How were you thinking of getting him appointed? I mean, let's say he said, "Yes, I'm interested."

A. Okay. Our feeling was at the time that, if we went to the Ministry of Higher Education, and we said, "We want this man," and the man was okay -- he had the right credentials as far as the revolutionary government was concerned -- then he would not be turned down.

Q. I see.

A. Okay, this was our scheme. We felt that our school was small enough that not too many people would want to fight over it. And here we are proposing somebody who looked good -- from their point of view. We felt that this way we would be able to handpick our own "revolutionary director."

So. He was noncommittal when he left. He said, "Well, I have to see. There are other positions that I may want to look at in the university. I'm not sure if I want to go back to the academic life." And we got the sense that he was looking to a ministerial position, because he had already had a pretty high position in the government. So, he was hoping

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that he would be offered something bigger than he had, and he would like to keep ICMS on the back burner, just in case he didn't have any options once there was an overhaul in the.... Okay, if you recall, at the time the elections were coming up, and the new government was going to be appointed, so everybody had their eyes to the next round of government positions.

Q. Was one of your requirements that this man would be full-time or did you sort of...?

A. No, in fact we would have preferred that -- from the faculty's point of view, we discussed this -- we would have preferred a ... not too much of a commitment from the man. We felt that the Iranian faculty could run the academic side of the school very well. We needed somebody who would come there and look after the external relationship of the school and we felt that job was not a full-time job. And we felt that if he wanted to keep his position or a full-time position, and this one on the side, well it would be acceptable to us.

So, Dr. Chavran did not work out. And we then went after the next person who we had been told would make a good head for our school, the Ayatollah Ghafouri -- Goizadeh Ghafouri.

Q. How did you people consider a clergy, a man of the cloth?

A. Well, we had been told very good things about him.
Okay.... We didn't have....

Q. It didn't strike you as something strange or out of this world?

A. You have to remember, at the time, clergy per se was not a bad thing. I mean, we had good clergy, such as Ayatollah Taleghani, and bad clergy such as the rest of them.

Q. So, from Jim Baughman to Ayatollah Ghafouri -- to an outsider it seems....

A. Well, you have to understand our options were narrow. We were operating in post-revolutionary Iran and utmost, in our mind, was the survival of the school. So the costume -- it really didn't matter what costume he wore to the party. What we wanted was somebody who would stand between us and the revolution.

Q. To protect you.

A. Yes, exactly. Somebody who would say, "Leave this little school on top of this little hill aside. That's my turf, that's my baby." And we felt that we might get away with it, because again ICMS was not a high ... did not have a high

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exposure.

Q. During this time did you fly the Persian flag and the ICMS flag? Talking about exposure.

A. I think we brought down the ICMS flag. I think we had the Iranian flag flying all the time.

Q. Even though it had the lion and sun? Which ... I guess for a while it was all right.

A. I think we had three flags flying at the same time, three Iranian flags. I don't recall....

Q. The old flag, the imperial flag?

A. Well, yes. I don't recall the lion and sun. I don't think our flag....

Q. That's right, it didn't. It just had the three colors.

A. The three colors. And that was what we were flying.

So. Now, after having said all that, we were very skeptical about this ayatollah. Because the lists of the good ayatollahs, or good mullahs, were pretty short. And we had not heard about this guy at all. We had heard he was on the

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... he was a member of the chamber of the constitutional assembly or a member of the constitutional assembly. But we said, "Well, let's go and talk to him. There's nothing wrong with that."

So, Boushehri -- who happens to be also a neighbor of this man -- arranged a meeting for us one night, one evening. So we all got together: myself, Farahad Rafii, Kamal Aragheyd, Farhad Simiyar, one other member of the faculty, I cannot recall his name, who joined us that year. Because that year we hired three people: Fati <Etemad-Moghadam>, Behrouz Mo'tazedi was one, but it was not him.

Q. It wasn't <Eliz> Majd?

A. It wasn't Majd. It was Movahedi.

Q. Yes, from IMI or from....

A. From, no he was not from IMI, he was from Aryamehr.
Aryamehr.

Q. Movahedi.

A. Movahedi. A very good man, a very solid, good person.
Who came along.

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So we went up, first to Boushehri's house -- we had some tea there. Then we walked across to the ayatollah's house. The ayatollah's house -- I must describe -- was an apartment building. It seemed like he owned the whole building.

Q. How many stories?

a. Two, two stories or three -- two stories, I think. And then we walked up the stairs into a barren room -- nothing on the walls, no chairs, no desks -- just an Iranian carpet, a Persian carpet, on the floor and just gray walls. Now outside the door, I must mention, there were something like eighteen pairs of shoes. So we assumed that we all have to take our shoes off, so we all took our turn in taking our shoes off.

Q. Were you wearing ties?

A. I don't think so. I don't think so. I don't think we were wearing ties. Although we were not trying to bend over backward to please this guy. When I tell you the story of what actually transpired, you will see that if we were not wearing ties it was not because we wanted to please him.

So, we took <off> our shoes and we went there. There was nowhere else to sit but on the floor, so we sat on the floor. It's very difficult sitting on the floor without any

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cushions, it's very difficult. So it took about five to ten minutes before he arrived; he wasn't there yet. Boushehri, by the way, was with us.

Q. The owners of these other shoes, you hadn't seen them?

A. No, we didn't see them; we didn't know where they were. Apparently those eighteen pairs belonged to the household of the ayatollah, who were in the other side of the house from this room, so.... But they had taken all of their shoes off before entering the building.

So, the ayatollah showed up about five, ten minutes later. A very modest man.

Q. You all stood up?

A. I think, yes we all did, yes. We all did. He shook hands with all of us. He had a sort of meager figure -- thin, glasses. He sat down and we all sat down again. He would not look at us -- in the face or in the eyes. This was a very interesting thing about this ayatollah. He would always look to the floor, talking to us.

Q. What color was his turban?

A. White. It was not a black ... he was not a "seyyed"

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<descendent of the Prophet>. It was white.

In talking to us, first of all there was about a good fifteen minutes of sort of warmup chitchat, small talk. He had, by the way, had been invited to our school for a speech, I think by the Gavahi connection or Boushehri connection. And we had missed -- at least I had missed -- his speech to the students.

Q. This is after the revolution, obviously.

A. Definitely, yes.

Q. So he had come to the school already?

A. He had been to the school; so he had known our school. I introduced the faculty, told him that the faculty, or the people who had heard him at our school, were impressed by what he had to say.

Q. Kasra was gone now?

A. Kasra was gone, yes. Kasra was gone.

Q. So officially there was no.... So who was in charge?

A. I was in charge.

Q. You were in charge. Okay.

A. So, I said that people had been impressed with what he had to say and his name had been mentioned by several people to us, so we have come there for Rahname'i.

Q. For guidance.

A. Guidance. Then after another ten or fifteen minutes of small talk again, he said, "What kinds of students do you have there?" We gave a profile of a typical student at ICMS, which we thought was a good profile. And then his next question was, "What do you teach to these people?" We said, "Well, these are the things we teach, and our problem has always been not enough local material, but we have managed over the seven years to have about a third of our material now from Iranian sources. Now we have to revise some of those because things have changed."

And then he raised the point of whether our students have any ... ideological commitments. Mote'ashed <is> the word I think he used.

Q. Yes, commitment.

A. Commitment. So we said, "We don't check on that. They

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come in from different walks of life, and they bring whatever they have with them, and they take it with them when they graduate -- it's only an eleven-month program." And then he sort of zeroed in on this particular point.

He said, "Well, are you telling me that if an Israeli engineer comes to you, and a Palestinian engineer comes to you, and your trade is teaching them how to build bridges, that you would take on both of them?" So we said, "Yes, that's right. Because we don't check on people's ideological, political background." And we gave examples that in the past there have been cases where people had had political records, prison records, before coming to ICMS, and we knew it was somewhat risky to take them for a small school, but we did, because we didn't feel that that disqualified them. So, yes, we said "Basically yes, we will take both of them. The more qualified one ... if they're both qualified, we will take them."

He was not very happy with that answer. And he wanted to get us to admit our past mistake, the way he saw it, of not screening our candidates for ideological commitments to the cause. Now, whatever cause -- he was not necessarily talking about religious causes, he was very cautious to avoid being overly religious in that meeting.

Q. Did he think that was possible in the past? Or he just

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wanted you to admit that was a mistake?

A. No, he wanted us to say that from here on, as we look into the future, we'd like to take people who are Mote'ahed to the enqhelab, to the revolution, committed to the revolution, committed to the cause. Okay. As it turned out later on, as the brief history of the revolution of Iran shows, that his cause and the Iranian revolution's cause were not the same either. So.... His son was later executed by the regime.

Q. Is he in hiding now?

A. And he is apparently in hiding. But he wanted, you know, a commitment, to the ideology, whatever ideology -- but for one ideology, one commitment. And we were pretty adamant. I think we all took our turn to defend a very easily defensible (by the way) point of view. Because it's not very difficult to say that eleven months is not long enough, that by screening candidates for their ideology, we would be making the same mistakes as the previous regime did for rejecting opposing views. But I felt that he had a more difficult time than we did in pressing his point of view. The meeting ended following this stalemate.

Q. What was Boushehri's role?

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A. Well, Soroushri made a.... That's an interesting question.

Q. Did he try to play the role of a middleman or did he just keep quiet?

A. He did, he did. No, he did. In fact, that's interesting, because initially he made a very brief introduction. And then towards the end, when he saw that we were not getting anywhere -- and when the faculty, prior to going to the ayatollah's place, had decided we were not going to sell ourselves short to appease the ayatollah, so we were not going to relent on our, what we felt was justified, point of view -- so when he saw this stalemate in the discussion at the very end, he interrupted and said that, "You must understand, Ayatollah, that these are the people who joined the school prior to the revolution and revolution is something that doesn't happen overnight. These people haven't yet caught on with the momentum, the intellectual momentum of the revolution." Therefore, he was trying to excuse us.

And we felt that was, to put it very mildly, a shitty thing to do, because that was uncalled for, his role was not defined to do that. And we were feeling very uncomfortable when he started saying that, because that was just not his role and that was not true -- what he was saying.

But the interesting thing is that the ayatollah turned and poured on him all his frustration that had been built up.

Q. On whom?

A. On Boushehri.

Q. What did he say?

A. Talking him that he had no right to say that. He had no right to classify people according to their degree of "revolutionariness," and this was a very presumptuous position he was taking. Which was.... You should have seen Boushehri's face.

Q. So how were you people supposed to do that, screen the students, according to Ayatollah?

A. Well, I think Ayatollah was playing a game with us ... and he wanted to win that game. He didn't. But at the same time, he wasn't going to let a Boushehri sort of define, describe, or explain what was happening in that ... in a very simple-minded way, which is Boushehri's style. So he sort of turned to Boushehri and really came down hard. For about a good ten minutes, he gave him a lecture -- a lecture that he probably is not going to forget for a long time.

Q. As he's sitting in a Baghdad jail right now.

A. As he's sitting in a Baghdad jail, one of the things that he's thinking about. So when we came out, Boushehri was silent. And then one of the first things he said was really meaningless, saying basically, "Did you hear Ayatollah, what he said to me? He's a very good man, he's a very understanding man." Anyway....

So we left the ayatollah's house feeling that he was not going to be a candidate, a serious candidate, for our school. We felt that he had his own axes to grind, and he did at the end say that he would be available to offer us any help that he possibly could. So he in a way left the door open. The next move was on us, and we never followed it up. It was the consensus of the faculty present at that meeting that Ayatollah Ghafouri would not make the kind of a director we were looking for. So we left feeling that our options are even....

Q. Is this before or after the hostage taking?

A. It's about that time. Now whether it was before or after, I don't know. I don't recall.

Q. Bazargan was still prime minister, or not?

A. I really don't know.

So, after that meeting Zandieh looked very good -- much better than before. And for the first time I seriously raised the question of Zandieh's....

Q. Why did he appear? Why did he look good? How did he look good?

A. Okay. Zandieh all of a sudden had been accepted as a ... as among the people who had been suppressed during the Shah's regime, and been given credit for it. In several meetings we had, his name was brought up as somebody who suffered through the previous regime. Now, I didn't know about his political background. He did have apparently some records, political records with the former regime, I wasn't aware of. So he was accepted by the more educated group of the post-revolutionary figures. He had been at ICMS, so he knew exactly what we were all about. From my brief association with him, he appreciated the case method.

We felt at the time that since he had gone through the same system he would not have too many axes to grind after joining the school. Because he had had his share of Harvard education, he had had his share of shaking hands with the prince, he had had his share of rubbing shoulders with

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Ladjevardia and so forth. So, we felt that his lack of academic credentials, which was the problem at the time when he joined ICMS and left ICMS, was not going to....

Q. No, he didn't get a doctorate.

A. He did get a doctorate.

Q. With the help of Mr. Nahavandi and Prince Abdorreza.

A. That's what I understand, that's what I understand. We tried not to raise that point even during the difficult times, periods we had with him. But we had that as one of our....

Q. Signatories for financial affairs and lots of...?

A. That's right. Before Jim <Beaughman> left.... Let's see. Okay. The transfer from Jim to Kasra <Ferdows> was in such a way that Kasra would head the school, I would sign the checks.

Q. I see.

A. And we managed to do that without your signature. Because according to the constitution, your signature was required for any -- or the treasurer's signature, perhaps,

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was required -- for any changing of people with the signature ... signing power. <Shapour> Ghane' was able to do that without having to resort to you or anybody else.

So I signed all the checks. I must say this, that Jim Baughman came to me and said, "This is going to be part of <the> record." He said that he has full trust in me and he would like me to take on the financial side of the school. So I accepted. So for a while, Jim and I were signing -- for the last, I think, week or so. And, then, from there on it was myself and....

Q. Ghane'.

A. Shapour.

So I followed.... Going back to the selection of the president for the school, I went back to Zandieh and held a meeting with him.

Q. Where was the meeting?

A. He was at the Behshahr building, central building on ... near Ferdowsi. And interestingly enough, he was in the middle of a symposium for all Behshahr workers' representatives. And this was a symposium in that big auditorium downstairs. That was, by the way, the first time

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I was seeing that building. It's a very impressive building and a very impressive auditorium. And he was up there on the stage, calling the tunes, addressing objections, making (what I felt) shallow speeches, patting everybody on the back, and saying "we're all in this together" kind of thing. But ... people were playing along with him.

So, at the end of that meeting.... He knew that I was coming there to discuss this issue. On the phone, he had said he was interested, he was interested to pursue this. So as I entered the auditorium, he stopped everything, introduced Dr. Kashani from ICMS: "As you know, ICMS is a well-known school of management, who has helped train many good managers for Iran." So he patted me on the back, too, along

So, at the end of the meeting, I gave him a ride to his house, and I went off to his house for tea or something.

Q. Where was he living then?

A. In....

Q. Shemiran somewhere?

A. Shemiran, yes. It's on the eastern side of Shemiran. Not as high as Sultanat-Abad, but below that. There's an area, I can't recall that.... Anyway, he had a modest

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house...

Q. Darrous?

A. Darrous. He had a modest house and a garden. He didn't have a car. He said he doesn't have a car, so that's why I gave him a ride. Along the way I made the proposal to him. He said, "Ghafouri is a good man. Maybe he and I could do something together." But the interesting thing was that, before I made any formal proposal to him, he had understood the whole background of why we were after him, and he was interested in the job.

Q. What do you mean "the background?"

A. Background is that we need somebody, ICMS is valuable enough, we need somebody to protect us, somebody who has credentials with the present regime. Somebody who understands the case method, somebody who is not going to destroy the ICMS, the basic foundations of ICMS for personal....

Q. He knew why you were after him.

A. He knew exactly why we were after him. And he was interested. In a way he saw himself as a good candidate for that position, and he was interested at the time. We didn't

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know why. I mean, before I even approached him, I had my doubts that he would even listen to us seriously because he was now heading the entire Behshahr group, and anybody in that position would be looking forward to a ministerial job and not a head of a small school. As it turned out, he had his share of problems running that huge operation. And later on, whoever I talked to, who was familiar with that period of his stay at Behshahr, would say that he was a very poor manager. Autocratic -- goes to a room, closes the doors and makes a decision, comes and announces it -- and that was sort of antithesis to the entire revolutionary movement among the workers. So he had his share of problems.

Q. But you didn't know it at the time?

A. We didn't know it at the time. Now, I must say that two or three people who knew him, post-revolution, told us he would not make a good president for the school. So I had to go, at some pain . . . describing we didn't have many choices either, and to tell him that we had done our homework. I told him that we had talked to Chamran, Ayatollah Ghafouri, and one other person we talked to on the phone and who rejected it offhand -- he said he's not even interested to come and visit us. So we said, "Well, these are the people. If you know some good man . . .?"

Q. Who were the skeptics? What kind of people?

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A. Who were the...?

Q. Skeptics, who....

A. Ah, skeptics!

Q. I mean, aside from Kamal?

A. They were the alumni of the school -- all of them. They had known him through Behshahr, had been working for Behshahr, known him through the Behshahr connection. Some of them even had him as their professor. But that was a biased point of view, I felt. The people who had known him as a manager, post-revolution, said he would not be a good man.

Interesting enough, Hedayat, who had also worked with him....

Q. Iraq Hedayat?

A. Iraq Hedayat. Had also said that he's a man full of complexes, very deep-hidden frustrations.

Q. He came to ICMS after he departed from Hedayat?

A. That's right, he had come to ICMS after departing from Hedayat's operation. So he had known him well because he had

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worked with him for three or four years.

Well, he was interested. And I invited him for a meeting with the faculty. Which he accepted, and we had our first meeting, I think, in less than a week. And there, we made the formal proposal, because everybody was there. And we said, "We're interested in you." And we were very open with him. We said we didn't want him to leave his other job -- not knowing that he was going to leave his other job and that's why he was accepting ICMS -- and that he could look at us as a part-time option, that we will then, with his help, try to put together a new ICMS that would fit the new requirements, post-revolution.

Q. At that stage did he make any statements about the weaknesses or the problems with ICMS that must be corrected? Did he make any statement about this?

A. Not at all. Not at all. At least I have no....

Q. At that meeting?

A. I have no recollection of him giving any hint that he would be a "revolutionary head" for the school. So, you know, following that meeting he looked even better than we thought. A very reasonable man. He knew exactly what we wanted and he knew exactly what his role was going to be. So

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the next problem, we told him, was, "Okay, whoever accepts this job has to sell himself to the ministry. Can we do anything for you?" We told him we didn't have many connections, but if there was anything we could do, we would. He said no, he would look after that himself, because he knows Shari'ati.

Q. The minister.

A. The minister of higher education -- and he would take it up with him in one of his meetings. He had a meeting with him in due time -- in not ... in a rather short period of time -- and apparently Shari'ati hadn't even heard of our school. He had only said, "Oh, okay, if there's such a school and you say it needs a head, well fine."

Now, what we wanted was to write a letter saying that this is the faculty proposing this fellow Zandieh to the ministry. But he said, no he doesn't want that, he wants to go himself. And so, he came back one day. And he set up office at ICMS.

Q. Without saying it's been approved.

A. Well, he said that it's in the process of approval, he was expecting a letter appointing him -- which ... a letter came. But the process was out of our control now. He was our head and he was coming on a regular basis.

Q. So what was it like the first time he came and started setting up?

A. Well, he told somebody at school -- I think it was not Ghane', it was somebody else -- that he wanted an office. And he said that he wanted that corner office across from Ghane's office.

Q. On the first floor?

A. On the first floor.

Q. This was a rather small office for a president.

A. A rather small office. Yes, that's right. And he had some plants brought in, a desk. He set that office up. He brought his books. He moved in.

He knew his way around ICMS, so that was no problem. Initially he was spending the day to day ... initially ... that's the first ten days or so, he was spending his mornings at Behshahr and the afternoons at ICMS. And then....

Q. Was he using the president's car?

A. Yes. Yes. He started using the president's car, because

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he said he didn't have....

Q. With the driver?

A. No, a driver was no longer being used. Because after Jim left, Karsra used the president's car for a while and he was driving himself. And then after that, he (the driver) was given a different job; I think it was a messenger. (He didn't like that demotion either.) So he was driving himself. He said he didn't have a car, he was going to buy a car. As soon as he buys a car, he will retire the school car.

So he would be mornings downtown, afternoons at ICMS. And that went on for about ten days. And then he was spending all his days there. So the faculty got together and wondered what's going on.

Q. Was that the first sort of hint that something's going wrong?

A. The deal is off. The first hint that the deal that we had for him, that he would be spending only part of his time at ICMS, was no longer....

Q. He hadn't taken any administrative actions or anything that would have indicated the deal was off before this?

A. He had held a meeting with the workers, which we joined -- a meeting with everybody, a la <By> Barnes, meeting with everybody, every member of the staff: workers, faculty.

Q. All the employees.

A. All the employees.

A. In the classroom?

A. In the classroom. And there, I don't recall the specifics, but my impression now is that he didn't say much to.... Rhetorical.

Q. To upset everybody or....

A. No. He did raise the question of this fellow who was kicked out of the school.

Q. Mirza'i.

A. Mirza'i. He raised the question of Mirza'i. But he said he would like to look at the arguments presented both ways before he makes a decision on that.

Now, His style, of course, was a different style. His style

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was "I am the head of the school" style. His style was "I have now been appointed by the revolutionary government to head the school." He did not say anything about us approaching him and making him the offer, which I thought at the time was unfortunate, because it was misrepresenting the faculty's role to the workers, who, later on, became a key player in this whole thing.

Q. Did you look at the good ... bright side of this at the time or were you worried? Did you perhaps think that maybe it was a good thing that he's doing this -- in the long run it's going to...?

A. We had misgivings following....

Q. That meeting.

A. His style of moving into the school. You have to remember, he's not a very sociable man. So he would come in, not talk to anybody, would go into his office, close the door, and would have meetings with a few workers, would come out and we'd see a desk being transferred to his room. Or he would have the car ... under ... he would start using the ICMS car right away, without consulting the faculty.

Q. When were J.B.'s <Kassarjian's> books and belongings packed up? Was this during the first few days of Zendieh?

A. It was during the first few days of Zandieh, yes. He came in and said, "Whose room...?" He started looking for a place for himself. And, if I recall, one of the first rooms he looked at was J.B.'s room. And then wondered why J.B. is not around and why his books are still there. So it was explained to him by the workers that he's left. So he made the arrangement....

Q. So the workers were responding to his questions, rather than the faculty?

A. That's right. So he made an arrangement with <the> workers to have all these books packed up and taken out of the office. That was another sign that the faculty's role as somebody who was going to work with him, as somebody -- to call a spade a spade -- who brought him to the school, was going to be subjugated to his relationship with the workers. I must say he had daily conferences with the individual workers at the school. And the faculty didn't hear anything about the content of those discussions.

Q. When did he start having common prayers with the workers?

A. Common prayers came a little later. Because the workers had asked Mr. Ghane' for a namaz-khaneh.

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Q. A room for prayer.

A. A prayer room. Which by that time had become a standard feature in every organization. And we said we didn't have a room for it, a separate room for namez-khaneh. An appropriate room -- we didn't have an appropriate room for it. So one of the first things ... one of the first obtrusive things he did -- which we felt was very much along ... playing up to the workers' demands -- was setting up this namez-khaneh. It happened something like maybe a month or so later -- an official namez-khaneh with a sign on the door.

See, it was not any one thing he did, but it was a collection of small events which, put together, gave us the picture of a man who is there, who wants to have the workers on his side, who doesn't really care if the faculty is disenchanted, who was going to gradually phase out the women employees of the school, who was going to use ICMS as a springboard for the next job.

Now as it turned out, he was involved with a political grouping, who was still on the margin -- and still is I think today -- with Peiman as its head, Dr. Peiman as its head. Based on things that he told us, told me -- privately at times, privately -- he was going to take his time while other parties and other groupings and other political figures were

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taking over responsibilities and being phased out, almost in an increasingly shorter and shorter time. So he wanted a home while there was storm out there, political storm, and wanted to move out when the time was right. And I think he's still waiting for that.

Going back to his association with Behshahr, we learned -- not from him but from people at Behshahr -- that he had resigned from his position as the head of the Behshahr group.

Q. Chairman of the board of directors there.

A. That's right. But -- he was still holding his job in the Ministry of Industries and Mines as the head of this office looking after all the nationalized companies, and he was spending a few mornings there. And he said that office is full of problems that he wants to get away from.

So, he was holding two jobs afterwards. But he was a full-time head of the school. And soon it became clear he was going to make the kinds of decisions that a full-time man makes -- such as salary adjustments, such as "who will do what" kinds of decisions, such as letters to women workers that they are no longer wanted.

Q. When was that decision made? How soon after he took over?

A. A couple of months -- maybe two, three months.

Q. All the women or just...?

A. Well he started with the weakest ones, people working in the admissions office.

Q. Why is that the weakest?

A. Because at the time we said we did not have ... were not going to have another year of MBA's, but we were going to spend one year preparing the school for what the revolution demanded from ICMS -- new material, new concepts, new analyses. This was one of the things that had been brought up in his discussion with the minister. Again, this was another of those events -- he came back from the meeting and said, "We decided, the minister and I decided, that we are not going to have the following year as a full year of academic year. We're not going to take any students for the next year." And that raised a storm in the faculty.

Then he immediately pulled back and said, "Well, but still we can go back with good reasons, good justifications and say no. But I'd like to have that reason worked out in the faculty." But it was very clear he had made up his mind.

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The faculty consensus following a meeting we had on that same issue was that we were not prepared to go ahead with another year, given the kinds of reactions we were getting in the classroom, from the students, using some of the prerevolutionary material. So we felt that ICMS, in order to survive, needed new material. And we could not teach and write as many cases as was needed, therefore we probably should stop a year, rewrite some of the old material write new material, and start over again.

Q. So, you were saying that when he started attending ICMS on a full-time basis, the faculty got together....

A. Very much. Because it became clear....

Q. At a meeting. So what do you remember about that meeting?

A. It wasn't easy to hold meetings without him being around, because he was always in his room. So we would hold meetings in my office, sometimes in Kamal's <Aragheyd's> office, in Farahad's <Rafii's> office.

Going over the turn of events, the unfolding of the various faces of Zendish, which we had not observed before ... some of these decisions, which we felt needed to be discussed, and

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we had discussed for a good nine months in the faculty, were now being made by him without consulting the faculty. And he defined the faculty's role purely as academic. He came out and said that, in fact. Because we questioned him on some of the issues. And he said, "Well, I want you to understand, my role as the official head of the school is beyond just academics. Academics you can look after. But I'm going to look after other sides of the administration of the school, including hiring, firing of people."

Now why he started from the admissions office ... because we had two women helping the admissions director, who herself was a woman, and it looked like they were not needed. We countered, offered the counter argument, saying that if we are going to write new cases, we need additional typing staff, and these people could fill that role. And he ... his official posture was that, "No, we would not need that many people, and we are oversized, and therefore we should reduce it." But he never talked about reducing the male employees.

So he started firing, and buying back, their services, their retirement, or the termination -- would pay them their termination fee and would release them. The entire admissions staff were fired, including Sousseh *(Daghighi)*, who had to go to court to get full compensation, because he was not going to pay her.

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Q. Let's come back to this point at our next session.

A. Okay. Fine.

Q. This tape is now just about ended, so



HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
IRANIAN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

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NARRATOR: KAMRAN KASHANI

DATE OF INTERVIEW: JULY 26, 1982

PLACE OF INTERVIEW: MYKONOS, GREECE

INTERVIEWER: HABIB LADJEVARDI

TAPE No.: 3

RESTRICTIONS: NONE

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1-KEN OF IRANIAN CRISIS

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BRODE, SPENCER

HOSTAGE CRISIS OF 1979-82

IRAN CENTER FOR MANAGEMENT STUDIES

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WOMEN

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

ZIONIST ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
IRANIAN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Narrator: Dr. Kamran Kashani

Date: July 26, 1982

Place: Mykonos, Greece

Interviewer: Habib Ladjvardi

Tape No: 3

Q. At the end of the last tape, we were discussing one of the events which took place subsequent to the presidency of Dr. Zandieh, and that was his decision to discharge members of the admissions committee. If we could begin with that.

A. Well, during that episode, Soroush <Baghchi> had to resort to the labor court, which was....

Q. You said that the decision to discharge the admissions board was not discussed in the faculty.

A. It was not discussed before it was made, but subsequent to the announcement we raised this point in the faculty meeting. And Zandieh was adamant that there was no need for an admissions staff, and there was no room for using the present employees, admissions employees, in other capacities.

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So. That was one of many points where the faculty and Zandieh were divided -- faculty on one side and Zandieh on the other. We were aware that the dismissal of the three people involved had more to do with their being women than an objective assessment of whether or not there was a need for them.

One day Zandieh and I, we took a walk on the ICMS entrance road. And he confided to me that ICMS had a very poor reputation as far as women were concerned. So I asked him to elaborate, and he said that many people outside considered ICMS as a center of corruption, and that's one of the reasons why he wanted to reduce the staff, the women staff, at ICMS.

Q. Did he elaborate on what he meant by corruption?

A. Well, I asked him if he himself believed that, or it was only hearsay, or it was a rumor that he was just reporting. His point was that, no, he did not really believe that, although in any organization, he said, where there are men and women working together, relationships could develop. But he felt that ICMS, because it had younger women, and perhaps better-looking women, was more of a corrupt place, considered by others, than maybe a usual organization outside. I did tell him that I did not feel that was sufficient to terminate people's employment, where they were supporting families, where husbands had been forced out of work, post-revolution,

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and ... but I don't think I got across on that point.

He never raised that point in the faculty meetings, by the way. He was trying to deal with each individual and the question of their dismissal as if it was a case by case situation. But for me, and I had reported this to the other members of the faculty, it was clear it was a systematic way of reducing the women employees at ICMS.

Q. So you say Soroush went to court?

A. She appealed to the labor court, which was still at the time operating. And the issue was that Soroush wanted to be compensated for the total of her employment at ICMS, starting at the time when she was a secretary, which would have been a good number of years. Whereas Zandieh wanted to start, or looked at her employment, from the point following her MBA graduation.

Q. She was a secretary at ICMS, then went through the MBA program?

A. MBA program, then was promoted to admissions director, and served in that capacity for, I guess, a couple of years. And the court ordered ICMS to pay for full compensation as far as the number of years were concerned. I think there was a decision made to compromise on the total salary because

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there was a big difference between her previous salary and what she was getting as the admissions director. So she was compensated finally by more than Zandieh was willing to offer.

The same thing happened, by the way, with the dismissal of Shapour <Ghane'>. He also had to resort to court and the court ordered full compensation, which he <Zandieh> did not pay. And Shapour took a lawyer and a court order to block that much from ICMS's account. And he was subsequently paid, even though it was, again, through a court process and not otherwise.

Q. What were the reactions when Sousan won this court case?

A. Oh, the reaction was that the others should also do the same thing, every time. Their reaction was that that was the right thing to do. And so other women employees who were candidates were going to ask for full compensation, otherwise they would have to go to court.

Q. So who were the others that were fired and what were their circumstances?

A. As I said, the entire admissions staff were fired. One or two newly-hired secretaries were also fired. They were still, I think ... if I'm not mistaken, they were still on

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their probation. A librarian, for example, assistant librarian, was one of these newly-hired people who was fired.

Q. What was the idea, that a librarian wasn't required?

A. That there was not much to do around the library anyway, and she was not needed.

Q. So was there a librarian?

A. Well, Mehri left Iran, but I'm not sure whether her departure was before or after this incident.

Q. I see.

A. It could have been after this incident, because Mehri didn't stay there. She left before the rest of the faculty did.

Q. What was the background to Ghane' getting fired?

A. Well, Ghane' and Zendieh were not on speaking terms for a long time.

Q. Why was that?

A. It had to do with Ghane' feeling, and I think justifiably

so, that Zandieh had taken over some of the responsibilities that Ghane' used to have, and had, in a way, officially put him aside, and had taken decisions that normally would have been Ghane's responsibility. Ghane' himself wanted to get fired. He had indicated that idea to me, because he knew there was no future for ICMS under the new leadership and therefore he wanted out. But he wanted out on his own terms. Zandieh, knowing that if he fired Ghane' he would have to pay a hefty compensation, wanted to make life as difficult as possible for him so he would have to leave on his own. I'm not sure exactly what it was, it was a series of incidents that....

Q. Didn't one have to do with the removal of the furniture from the vice president's room or something without Zandieh's permission? Some files that were in the vice president's room, and Ghane' had removed those and he was accused of stealing property or something?

A. I think that was used. Remember, this was done prior to Zandieh's arrival.

Q. I see. I didn't know that.

A. This was done prior to Zandieh's arrival. This was a request by Dr. Ladjevardi to have some of his files in a ... the personal ... property or in the personal charge of

Ghane'. And Ghane' took some files, personal files, or Dr. Ladjevardi, to his house before Zandieh's arrival.

Q. Also personal furniture.

A. Yes, I think so. There were some pieces of furniture, his own (Dr. Ladjevardi's) furniture. Now, this was reported to Zandieh at some point following his taking the directorship job at ICMS. Now, I know he used it as an excuse, not to fire him, but not to pay compensation after he fired him. So the firing act came some time later, because the two of them, as I said, were not on speaking terms for a long time. And Ghane' had gone to his office at one point and had raised hell with him, in his own style, and even that didn't lead to his being fired.

It was a combination of a number of things that led Zandieh to actually write the letter that he would be fired. And in that letter, among the many, or a number of, acts of unbusiness-like behavior on his part, he <Zandieh> had mentioned that he <Ghane'> has removed without any authorization the personal files of Dr. Ladjevardi. And so it was used as an excuse, but not the cause of it. It was not.

Q. There were some allegations that some SAVAK files were removed?

A. Well, the files did return to ICMS, because....

Q. Why was that?

A. When was that?

Q. Why? The personal files were returned?

A. The personal files were returned to ICMS because that was becoming a difficult bone of contention between Shapour Ghane' and the school. Shapour felt that if he was ... that if the accusation of SAVAK files were actually heard by some revolutionary court, he might be in deep waters. So, under that kind of pressure, he arranged for the files to be returned to ICMS. And Zandieh set up a committee of three -- two workers and a secretary -- to be present when the file would be opened.

And the file was opened. They went through and they found nothing but personal files. And then the accusation was made that maybe Shapour had removed these items from the file. Now, I had seen the file and this was jam-packed with papers, with documents, personal documents. There was no way anything could have been removed. If anything, one could accuse the people for having stuffed the files, but not removing anything -- it was just ... packed from the top

drawer to the bottom. So that didn't lead anywhere. Now....

Q. Was the committee satisfied? Were they...?

A. Well, the committee was not satisfied in the sense that ... an interesting thing is that the secretary-representative, she was the one who had actually arranged the files into the file. But the atmosphere of the time was such that she did not like, she did not want to be found defending Dr. Ladjevardi, saying that this is all there was. So when one of the two worker members of the committee....

Q. Who were they, do you remember?

A. Heidari was one. And there was a third one, which I do not.... One of the two said "Well, the fact that there are no SAVAK files only means that it was here and has been removed." But that was the end of that affair. There was no evidence anywhere and Zandieh was happy just to drop that. Because he himself did not feel very comfortable being the persecutor of a case where the culprit might be Ladjevardi. I mean he just did not feel very comfortable in that situation, even though he was not exactly enchanted with the personality, with Dr. Ladjevardi at the time when he was there and subsequent to his departure. He still felt some sort of a personal attachment which he did not want to

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violate. He'd never pronounced it, but it was clear that he was doing that only because the workers had demanded it, and he wanted to not be caught between the workers and Dr. Ladjevardi or Shapour Ghane'. So after the search of the files, that issue was dropped.

Q. So, when Ghane' was in the process of being fired, what was the role of the spectators, or the remaining members of the faculty, and staff?

A. Well, the faculty's judgment on that was that it was inevitable. Shapour was Shapour Ghane'. Shapour was the only remaining member of the administration from before. Shapour had very close links with Habib Ladjevardi. That the issue of loyalty was certainly <more> in favor of the former regime than the present regime. And Shapour was a straightforward person -- he would not want to play the role of a newly-born revolutionary. And in addition to all of this, Shapour had a very low regard for the person of Zandieh. That was inevitable.

Shapour was himself very unhappy because the workers were on his back. He had lost faith with the workers, or lost face with the workers.

Q. What were the issues?

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A. Simple issues. He could not really enforce, like he used to, the procedures and rules, regulations of the school, because the atmosphere of the country had changed, and he was very aware that the old days, when he could fine people, were gone. His old tools for controlling and motivating people were no longer effective. In fact they would backfire.

And Shapour is not a very flexible person that would change his style and his methods to fit the requirements of the times. He was most of the time in his room. He wouldn't come out and go and do his usual vsarkeshi <inspection>. He was spending almost all of his time in his room. He was not very happy following the departure of Dr. Ladjevardi -- he had even mentioned that, that he was not very happy. Because he had always considered his presence there more due to Habib Ladjevardi's association with the school than on his own. So....

Q. Were there any interesting reactions from his subordinates? Did they seek the opportunity of being promoted or were they defending him?

A. Okay. Well, the workers ... one of the first demands of the workers -- it arrived ... a set of demands to Zendeh arrived less than a week after his relocating to ICMS. One of the first demands of the workers was the dismissal of Ghane' and his deputy.

Q. Rostam or Arya?

A. Rostam. And among the charges levied against Ghane' was that he was cruel, inhumane, to them, that he had ties with the Ladjevardis, that he had -- and this is probably the most interesting one -- he had an illegitimate affair with a women secretary, who was no longer there at the time, but who had just returned from a two-year training trip to the UK. Now Zandieh heard that and he, in a way, put it on the back burner. We were aware of the demands of the workers, but he did not want to ... somehow he did not want to take that one up right away after his arrival.

But it was clear that Zandieh and Shapour could not work in the same institution. Very, very clear. It was less than a month when Shapour went to his office and called him all kinds of names and walked out. Subsequent to that he apologized for his behavior. But he stood his line basically, asking him to fire him, which he did not want to do for the compensation reason.

Q. Ghane' asked Zandieh to fire him.

A. Yes. He said, "I'm not really fit for this school, you know that. But I'm not going to walk out of here on my own. You have to fire me." And Zandieh, in his own way, I guess,

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he just sat back and listened and said, "Well, I'll think about it."

He didn't take any action until some time later when another issue came up. And he then used a number of reasons, including the reference we made to the files, to justify his dismissal by cause -- which he lost again. Because the courts ... at the time, again, they were being more sympathetic to the people who were being dismissed than the....

Q. The authorities.

A. The authorities.

Q. So, from this point on, what were the points of conflict between the faculty and Zandieh, and from what point did the faculty itself feel threatened they were maybe losing their jobs?

A. The faculty for the most part was not concerned about losing their jobs. And I say "for the most part" because out of five, six (I can't recall the number we had), maybe one or two were concerned. And the reason for that was that the faculty felt, we felt, that Zandieh could not run a school without the faculty. In other words, the Ministry of Higher Education would remove him if he was heading a school that

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had secretaries and workers, but no faculty. So we felt that he needed us perhaps more than we needed him.

Now, I must tell you also that the faculty had a very interesting scheme to make sure that he does come to terms with the faculty, his faculty. And that was that we sold him the idea of having a full year, academic year, in 1980-81, during that year, with a revised curriculum and with a new student body. English would no longer be required, it would be all Farsi. And we felt we would be deluged with a large number of applications. He bought that idea.

This was before he came back and told us that he had had another talk with the minister of higher education and that it was final, that we just couldn't take any students. And if you remember, at the time, they were closing down the universities because of the clashes.

So after he agreed with our demand, or with our suggestion, that we were going to have ICMS operating the following year, we would start the students on a different program, a revolutionary program -- in the sense that we'd send them out to the field and say "Well, come back, come back with ideas, with suggestions, with cases, with research work, with things that we can use later on in our teaching." He kind of liked that idea. He wanted ICMS to be operative.

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So after that we didn't really have any fears for our jobs because we knew that he could not replace us.

Q. There was no thought of his bringing faculty from other universities?

A. No, even though we were concerned about that. No, he didn't. He didn't even mention any names, or.... One thing was clear to us: that he knew very well that teaching by the case method is not very easy -- he had gone through that experience himself. So that was another reason we felt fairly sure he would not dismiss the faculty as a whole -- maybe one or two members, selectively. But then again, we had indicated to him very well, in our various meetings and discussions that we had with him, that the faculty was going to stick together. It was very clear from the discussions, for example in the faculty meetings, that he would be on one side of the issue and all the faculty on the other.

Q. Did we make any attempts to establish alliances with the faculty to win some friends over on his side?

A. He's not a ...you have to remember, Zendieh is not a smooth operator. Maybe he did make some attempts. I think he always thought that I was on his side. But then when the issue came to the discussion or a faculty vote, I sided with the faculty -- it was very clear. I tried to use my special

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relationship with him, because it was very clear between him and I, at least, that I was responsible for his being the head of ICMS. And he cherished that. I mean he liked the title. He liked to come back to that school as its head. He liked to think of himself as the savior of ICMS in the revolutionary times.

So in a way he had a different relationship with me; in addition to that, I knew him before he departed from ICMS. And maybe he did try to see if he could win me over, and maybe through me win Farshad over, but....

But I also tried to use my relationship with him to lay the background, the ... to smooth him up before a difficult issue came to a faculty discussion or vote. For example, such as the departure of the other women, which the faculty finally got together and wrote an open letter to the members of the ICMS community denouncing this one-sided -- the word is not really sexist, but biased -- attitude towards the women employees ... which had its own repercussions and so forth.

My conclusion, based on that few months of working with Zendieh, was that he was a very complicated person, a very complex man. It's easy to say that he was playing along <with> the revolutionary behavior, but I think deep down he really had fallen for this revolution and deep down, in many ways, he wanted to do good for what he thought was the cause.

That's why the personal relationships were of secondary importance in his decision-making, his behavior, at ICMS.

Q. So what were the important events from that point to the time that you departed from Iran? What were the highlights of ICMS?

A. Well, we had announced in the paper -- this was in the spring of 1980 -- we had announced in the papers that ICMS was going to take a new crop of students. And we had indicated the conditions for admission, which were basically the same as before except that we had dropped the English as a requirement, and at the time we even ... as a primary requirement, although we asked for some proficiency in ^{<?>} English. We were discussing with IMF_{as} to how we could test that limited proficiency in English, because we felt that we could not translate all our cases by the fall of 1980 and we would probably have to rely still on some English cases. But discussions would be in Farsi.

Our prediction was correct in the sense that we were flooded with applications. I can't recall the number, but it was upwards of 700, 800 applications. Huge number. We were really elated. And we felt that, okay, we have now Zandieh tied up, in the sense that he will have to play the faculty's game, because it would be very embarrassing for him to have

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answer to some 700 applicants that there will not be a school next year.

It was in the first week after the announcement and the following telephone calls for information and the arrival -- people actually came on foot to ICMS with their applications, with their money and requested an application. A huge number -- the school was crowded with these people. He came back from the ministry telling us that we had to close down, like all the other universities, at the beginning of Khordad or end of Khordad. It was the end of Khordad. Because at the time, if you recall, the Iranian government was facing difficulty with the universities and the easiest solution to that problem of student uprisings was closing down universities. So we fell victim to that.

We told him that since we are a special school, maybe we can continue operating. But he said that he had had discussions with the minister and other people at the ministry and that there was no way we could distinguish ourselves. So that was the subject of a very heated discussion ... in the faculty meeting. We basically put the question to him: "Whose interests are you safeguarding? Is it the interests of ICMS or is it the interests of the authorities, whoever they are?" And it was very clear, his answer to that question was basically, "I'm here as the appointed head of the school, by the revolutionary government, and I have my first priorities

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to serve their wishes." He was not going to go against the authorities on that issue.

Another one had to do with the compensation for J.B. Kassarjian, who had left the school, wanting to come back, but the faculty, the Iranian faculty, had advised him not to return. The reason for that was <that> immediately following -- or let me add this -- before his departure the students went to his house and....

Q. He was living in Jim Baughman's, the former president's, house.

A. Jim Baughman's, that's right. Went to his house and gave him a gift, a gold....

Q. Medallion.

A. Medallion, yes. And they wished him well and told him....

Q. They got him a medallion, for the record, it should be said, which said, "We're waiting for you to come back," something like that.

A. That's right. On that medallion it said that ... something like, "Looking forward to seeing you very soon,"

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something of that kind. Now, the number of the students, I don't know, but it could have been between ten and twenty, but no more than twenty.

Q. Out of how many?

A. Out of, at the time, I think a class of sixty, sixty-five perhaps. Now, after his departure, there was a big poster that went up on the walls of the dining hall, in English, denouncing J.B. and denouncing the students who had gone up to see him before his departure, and denouncing the act of giving him a gift before leaving. Their point was that J.B. was not a good influence on ICMS. That he was using the students in his own way. That he was another representation of the American, the defunct American, or corrupt American, influence on the Iranians. Now we felt that that letter was written by no more than four or five people.

Q. It was unsigned obviously.

A. It was unsigned. Now, that started a debate, not a very healthy one, among the students: who did what, who said what, who was present when that letter was written, how many people really would have voted for J.B., and that kind of thing. Now, in that atmosphere, we felt that J.B.'s return was not going to be good for him. So when he called to find out what the situation was, Kamal <Aragheyd> basically told him that

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it was the faculty's judgment that he should not return. And I think that J.B. was not very happy, not with the faculty decision, but with the turn of the events which led to the faculty's decision on that.

When Zandieh came, Zandieh wanted to know what was the status of Dr. Kassarjian. So we basically told him, "He's still on the faculty but he's not around." Now I don't recall if he was getting paid by the school or not. I don't recall that. Maybe he wasn't. But the fact was that his books were there, and his office was there, and his personal belongings were still in his office and in his house. Well, Zandieh felt that that unclear definition of his role, his association with ICMS, should be clarified by his being terminated from ICMS. Well, we had no objection to that because we felt that things were not going to develop for better. We had already made the decision that his presence around ICMS was not healthy and we just felt, well okay, we might as well ... that decision to be finalized.

Now, where we did disagree with Zandieh in that, again in one of those painful discussions we had, was on the question of compensation. We felt that J.B. should be compensated for his services.

Q. To the end of his contract.

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A. End of his contract, which, if I recall, was the end of that year -- if I'm not mistaken. And since he's being fired, he should be paid full compensation for whatever that ... was due to the faculty. This is following the hostage taking. And this is also following the arrival ... return of Zandieh's daughter to Tehran. And following her inability to return to the States after....

Q. She was a student at Brandeis?

A. She was a student at Brandeis.

Q. She had come to see her father?

A. That's right.

Q. For vacation.

A. For vacation, for New Year's vacation, Iranian New Year's vacation, around March of 1980. And she could not return to the States because of Carter's ban on Iranians traveling to the States. This was the background.

So when the question came whether or not J.B. should be compensated, Zandieh said that there was no.... First of all, Zandieh said he felt J.B. had played a very useful role at ICMS. He was a good teacher, he had been a plus to ICMS.

Now as far as payment, compensation, goes, he says there's no way J.B. should receive any payments from ICMS. We asked him why and he said, "Well, he's an American." So we said, "What does that say -- prove?" He said, "Well, as we know, Americans have stopped, have withheld our money, blocked our -- Iran's -- assets in the States, have blocked Iranians traveling to the U.S."

At that point, I guess, a number of us, we looked at each other from the corner of our eyes knowing that he was referring to his daughter's predicament; that also he would have a very difficult time justifying that decision to authorities: paying an American following the hostage taking. But then we ... we said, "Well he's not really an American; I mean, he may be naturalized, but that doesn't prove anything. He's still a member of the faculty."

Anyway, we departed feeling as bitter as anything at that meeting. And he was adamant, there was no way the faculty would force him to pay anything to J.B. But, then again, we heard one morning that he had ordered his stuff, his belongings, to be packed and put aside -- which didn't go over very well either -- with at least Kamal who felt that Kamal should have been informed because he wanted to look after -- personally after -- J.B.'s belongings.

As to the other events, other issues that came up -- if you

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recall, following our denunciation of his practice of systematically eliminating the women employees or dismissing the women employees through that open letter, he wrote a letter to the faculty, and in his own way tried to punish the faculty for that act. And his way of punishment was that we will no longer be receiving some of the fringe benefits which we had, by contract, coming to us, because the revolutionary government was no longer allowing those fringe benefits to be paid -- such as rent allowance.

He said that he had -- this was the funny one -- he had asked the school to put a stop to financing our subscriptions to various journals, which he felt that we were receiving personally ... privately. Of course that was nonsense, because whatever journals we were receiving through ICMS we had paid for; ICMS had nothing to do with it. For example, I was receiving the New Yorker, and he loved to come to my office and take a look at the cartoons in the New Yorker. He even said one time that he felt that was one of the best American weeklies. But he felt, he thought at the time, that it was financed by ICMS, which it was not. So we wrote him... And he sent a copy of that letter to the Ministry of Higher Education, as a way of, I guess, telling us that he's still got ammunition, that he's not using, against us.

So we wrote a letter back to him that evening. We spent a

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good five, six hours working on that letter -- Kamal and myself, with help from Farshad -- telling him that ... one by one, refuting his points, and basically telling him that if he wants to break our contract, fine; but he would ... but he's underestimating the integrity of the faculty if he feels that with these kinds of cheap shots he would be able to placate us, to put us in a corner where we would then agree with his policies and his decisions and his administration.

Now following that exchange, we didn't really hold any meetings, serious meetings -- maybe one or two -- and the situation had deteriorated to the point that rarely did we see one another. Even around school we tried to avoid one another. Zandieh was always with his workers; the faculty were always with the students. That was our dividing line.

This particular relationship held through all the way to the graduation day. The students wanted a graduation ceremony. And the faculty had mixed feelings on this. On the one hand, we felt that the year had not been really finished; we were forced to cut short our year, therefore we really didn't feel that these guys deserved the degree they were receiving. On the other hand, the students were a victim of a situation over which they had no control. So we wanted to be fair to them. And towards the end they were siding more and more with us and less and less with Zandieh.

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So we felt that we wanted to have the graduation, but we wanted to have it our own way. And one of the items we set down conditionally was that Zendieh would not attend that one, that graduation. That was a difficult one, of course, him being the head of the school. So we went ahead with the plans for the graduation, without informing Zendieh, hoping Zendieh would get the message that he's not welcomed -- this was a student-faculty affair.

This uncertainty was killing him, obviously. So he came to us -- and we hadn't talked for a long time, maybe a month or so. So on the day of the graduation, just before the faculty was supposed to go down, with the caps and gowns, fully dressed for the ceremonies, he came up to the room fully dressed, and said, "Well, when are we going down?" Which was really funny because we didn't tell him that there was a graduation, but he had two choices: one, to ignore us, which would have been embarrassing to him.

Q. Who was giving instructions to the administrative people?

A. We were working with Eghbal <Alavi>, so Eghbal was the coordinator. And Eghbal was scared to death that the graduation may not happen because at the very last minute Zendieh and us, we might have a fight, which may end up <with> none of us appearing on the podium to hand out the diplomas. And she told us on a number of occasions that she

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has nightmares of this whole graduation, with the students, with their ... people whom they had invited -- it was still a big affair, 200-300 people affair.

Q. So what happened?

A. He had invited... Without consulting us, obviously, he had invited -- I must say that he and Eghbal were on speaking terms still at the time, so he still could get some information as to when what was going to happen during the graduation. He had invited the minister of higher education as the speaker for the affair. I think by that time, by the way, the minister was no longer the minister; somebody else had replaced him. So he was the former minister and maybe that's why he agreed to come and make a speech.

Anyway, So he had also a personal stake in this whole thing. And when he came up to the faculty, just before we went down, it was very clear that we could ask him anything and he would do it, just to not embarrass him -- so that he would not be embarrassed in front of the students.

He had lost face with the students, by the way, because the students proposed to him -- with our encouragement -- that he should take up teaching again. And he flatly had refused that. We had an open confrontation with him in front of the students where he denounced Fati, who was teaching an

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economics course, as someone who had not done her homework to prepare relevant revolutionary material. This is right in front of the students. So I raised my hand and I said, "Well, as you might know, preparing relevant revolutionary material is very difficult. Some of us have the guts to go ahead, and take the risk, and do our best with the available material, which Fati did. And she's paying for it, now she's being blamed for it. And some of us don't even have the guts to appear in front of the students with something <with> which we feel less than comfortable."

And the students knew exactly who I was talking about, and we told the students in no uncertain terms that Zendieh had the training to teach them the business policy and Kamai did not have the training. And therefore, they were getting a second-rate education because Zendieh was not teaching them. Well, they didn't forget that.

There were a number of other incidents where the students were confronting Zendieh, minor ones. So Zendieh was sure that if it came to a head, the students -- a majority of them -- would be siding with the faculty. There were a few troublemakers who were always trying to create a situation whereby the faculty would be on one side and the workers and Zendieh would be on the other side.

One case was this leftist student who was a true organizer,

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who organized the workers into a semi-union, and who would give them instructions, who would write their proclamations for them -- the words they were using in their proclamations against the faculty were coming from a very good vocabulary of Persian language, and the workers couldn't even write their own names. But he and a few other students with different orientations (most of them Islamic) ... but this person and one other student were leftists, were on the side of the workers every time there was an issue.

The interesting thing was that the faculty were really the workers at ICMS. They were the ones who were running the wheels of the school. And the workers were really the staff. In other words, we could still run the school without the gardeners, without the electricians, without the plumbers; whereas they couldn't run the school without us. And we tried, unsuccessfully, to impress upon them that, really, this worker-management analogy didn't really apply to ICMS -- the way they saw it, at least.

Q. So the graduation ceremony...?

A. Well, the graduation ceremony went well.

Q. Everybody attended, the faculty and the president?

A. Yes, everybody attended. It was a very cold one. The

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faculty had decided among themselves that if Zandieh, in his speech, which he had prepared, said anything derogatory about the people whom we respected -- including Habib Ladjevardi and including J.B. -- if he said anything which we felt was unfair to these people, we would just stand up and walk out.

Q. Why did you think he may be saying something? On an occasion like that?

A. We felt that maybe he would look at that occasion as another opportunity to impress a larger, much larger, audience with his revolutionary feelings. This was the largest audience he ever had around ICMS: two or three hundred people. But to our surprise, he was very . . . very reasonable in the treatment of the past of ICMS, including the people who had helped create ICMS. He didn't mention any names, but he had some complimentary things to say about them. As I say, he is a very complex person. It's difficult to call him . . . to classify him very easily. It's very difficult to classify him as one or the other.

Q. So after the graduation, with the prospect that there will be no students in the coming year, what was the plan?

A. The plan was that the faculty would come back from their vacation . . .

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Q. Long vacation?

A. No, it was supposed to be one month. He proposed it. The interesting thing is that he proposed a three month's vacation and the faculty said, "No, we would like to come back. We have nothing to do with three months, so we'd like to come back."

Q. Like before.

A. Like before. One month, one month is enough. So he said, "Fine." He couldn't make that one *<out>*. He said, "What are you going to be doing?" We said, "Well, we're going to be coming to our offices on a daily basis. We will start looking into opportunities for case writing." This was at a time when at least two members of the faculty were sure they were not going to be there.

Q. Who was there at this time? Who attended the graduation?

A. The people who attended the graduation were myself, Farshad Rafii, Kamal Argheyd, *<Siāmak>* Movahedi, Fati Etemad-Moghadam.

Q. Rostam *<Kavoussi>*?

A. No, Rostam was not there and Farhad.

Q. Farhad Simiyar.

A. Farhad Simiyar. The graduation ceremony was cut-and-dried; there was none of that post-graduation hugging and kissing which went on usually. There were noticeably more women in the audience with chadors. Less colorful dresses on the part of the women. Lots of open-necked shirts, shirt-sleeved men.

Q. Without ties?

A. Without ties. Some of the alumni had come, just to see this <unclear> perhaps. The faculty knew that this was going to be, well, their last for a long time, because the faculty was going to a.... Even the people who were staying at ICMS at the time -- such as Farhad and Kamal -- who knew that ICMS, if it ever opens up its doors again to the students, it will be something that will be hardly resembling what they had come to know as ICMS. So it was ... even though it was a different graduation, but it was a memorable one in that respect.



HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
IRANIAN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

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NARRATOR: KAMRAN KASHANI

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INTERVIEWER: HABIB LADJEVARDI

TAPE No.: 4

RESTRICTIONS: NONE

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INDEX OF TRANSCRIPT

NARRATOR: KAMRAN KASHANI, IRANIAN
TAPE NO.: 84

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

JEWISH CENTER FOR MANAGEMENT STUDIES

JOSEPHSON, ROBERT

RESOLUTION OF 1970

RESOLUTION OF 1971, EVENTS OF 11 & 22 JANUARY 1979

RESOLUTION OF 1972, EVENTS PERTAINING TO

STUDENTS, COLLEGE, STATE OF

UNITED STATES, SUPPORT OF IRANIAN IRREVOCABLE AFFAIRS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
IRANIAN ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Narrator: Dr. Kamran Kashani

Date: July 29, 1982

Place: Mykonos, Greece

Interviewer: Habib Ladjevardi

Tape No: 4

Q. If we could spend this session going over the involvement and participation of the students and the alumni in the revolution and the revolutionary mood as it evolved.

A. Okay. Prior to the revolution actually taking place, those two or three critical days, there was no open sentiment -- at least expressed by the students -- for the revolution -- as a group. Individuals would sit with members of the faculty and discuss their views and, for the most part, they were for the revolution, for what was happening.

Q. Just to backtrack. The day that the Shah left, was the mood in ICMS the same as we saw on television -- the same jovial mood that was on the streets? Or was there nothing?

A. The day that the Shah left ... I don't recall. I just

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don't recall. He could have left on a Friday, when the school is closed, because I recall that I was not at the school at the time -- or a Thursday afternoon. But on the day of the revolution, or on the day, the first day -- I think it was Bahman 21st -- they were getting into cars and driving around Tehran, against the orders of the military authorities to stay at home. So even though they were not actively participating, but they were pro the revolution and, at the same time, there was no group action, as such.

Following the revolution, we had very interesting incidents with the foreign students being around the school. Some of them came back from their visits to different parts of the city, telling us about what they had seen, which was very interesting. One of the African students, who was stopped around Takht-e Jamshid by the revolutionaries -- if you remember, the order of the city of Tehran was in the hands of the militia, self-appointed guardians -- and he was stopped ... thinking that he was an American. And it took about ... a number of hours before he established his identity and he was allowed to go.

I remember this Chinese fellow coming back from a visit whereby -- again, a visit, he was driven around town by his Iranian friends -- where he came back and said, "Well, we saw this bunch of young kids who, just to impress us, they said, 'Do you want to see us fire our guns?'" (in English, I

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think). So his response was, "Yea, let's see you fire your guns," and they started shooting in the air.

There was ... for the revolution, I guess, there was a jovial mood among the Iranians. Also there was a mood of relief that finally those nights that they had to study without light, without electricity, when there was no fuel for getting around town or going back and forth between their home and the school during the weekends was over.

Q. The shortages were over.

A. The shortages were over. Other than that, I do not recall any other specific student-related event post ... following the revolution. And a few days maybe they were mourning the dead and maybe they had a class action, the class thought they would stop. In fact I remember this happened, now when exactly it was I don't recall, that they said, "Well, we will stop the afternoon class and then hold the afternoon class on Thursday afternoon." And a number of days we did this. That is they were committed not to missing any classes, but they wanted to join the revolutionary ceremonies in the afternoons.

Q. So when did you start feeling it in class? When did they start criticizing the cases and that kind of thing?

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A. Well, that didn't really happen in the year of the revolution. It was the following year.

Q. I see.

A. In the year of the revolution, the expectations were the pre-revolution expectations of our school.

Q. So maybe we ought to skip over to when this thing really began. You were telling me about some class that you had yourself.

A. It was in the first or the second week after the classes had started -- this is the 1979-80 academic year -- so we are sometime in late September, early October '79. And I had a session, a marketing class, on market segmentation. I had written a very good case on this subject based on the marketing plans of the then pre-revolution U.S. Trade Center in Iran. The question, or the issue, was a classic marketing issue: how do you segment the market, in this case for automotive repair and maintenance equipment, as viewed by U.S. Trade Center, who was organizing an exhibition by the American manufacturers in Iran within that industry. I had written a case in 1975 on that other issue -- on that case -- and I had used it very successfully in the class previously -- I had used it maybe four or five times. And again, before the revolution there was no problem with the case. The

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issues came out. Again, as I say, it's a classic case and I went ahead and used it.

The only adjustment I had made in my whole class outline was to take out those cases which referred specifically to the Shah's plans or Shah's acts ... decrees or whatnot.

Therefore, most of my sessions were the same. Marketing -- I did a few and it didn't require too much of an overhaul.

So, this is, again, a post-revolutionary class and I started a case. I asked a straight question from somebody -- unannounced. I said, "Well, why don't you tell me how you would have done if you were Mr. Hahn (who was then the deputy director of this center, U.S. Trade Center)?"

Q. How do you spell "Hahn"?

A. These were, by the way, disguised names -- H, A, H, N, Hahn. Now this fellow started questioning the issues not from Hahn's point of view, but from an Iranian revolutionary point of view. Saying that he would not be in a position to make that kind of a decision, he would like to look at it from an Iranian revolutionary -- he didn't say a revolutionary, but it was clear it was a post-revolutionary attitude. So I said, "You're not really answering my question."

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Another student raises his hand, and he said that they felt most uncomfortable, him and his group, and maybe there were others in the classroom who have felt this, discussing this case the night before, "because here you are trying to promote the U.S. trade, specifically, but on a larger scale the U.S. influence on the Iranian economic scene." And therefore, they have read the case, they have studied the case, they are familiar with the issues but they don't feel comfortable discussing it in the classroom.

Initially, I thought this was a tactic by some students who may not have been prepared for that session, to evade the more academic side of the issues. But then I noticed there were other hands going up and I realized this is ... I have a problem. And I had a session -- an hour and twenty minutes -- and I wanted to get through. So I ... briefly, I said that, "As you should know by this time, a case is not designed to teach you how to do a specific ... how to solve a specific problem in a specific company in a specific time, it's the broader issues that we are dealing with. Therefore, this case fits very nicely in discussing the issues that I would like to discuss in the case. And I could have used an American case in its place; but this is an Iranian case, you are familiar with Iran and therefore I felt very justified in selecting and using the case. On the other hand, if there are people in the class who do not feel comfortable with the issues of the case, with this case, I will allow them to

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leave the class and I will not take that against them in my review as evaluation of those people. And this is the only concession I can make to the class -- or to those people of the class."

At which point in time, two people got up, and then a third and a fourth and a fifth -- altogether something like seven or eight people left the class.

That was the first incident at ICMS that indicated that this year might be a very different year -- might be a very difficult year for some people. This was an indication that even though these people applied, for the most part, during the pre-revolutionary period, that somehow the revolution has gotten to these people. And even though they come from backgrounds no different from previous classes, that their attitudes, and therefore some of their actions, may be very different, and as the year progressed that suspicion became a reality.

After the class, we had a session, prearranged, to meet with the faculty for some refreshments over at the former president's house, but now where J.B. <Kessarjian> was living. There the students who had left the class came to me and apologized. I told them that I did understand their point of view; it was not ... to me at least, it was not incomprehensible what they felt. On the other hand, I had

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difficulty reconciling the academic objectives of the class, which was the prime objective, with the more distant issues that they were raising. I felt that the academic issues or the academic side of this particular incident overrode the more distant issues of how the U.S. has influenced the Iranian economic development and so forth.

Later on, another maybe ten issues later, when we were discussing marketing research, I had written a very brief -- and a good case -- on how do you design a questionnaire, how you administer a questionnaire, based on the questionnaire designed and administered two years previously by the Census Bureau.

Q. Iranian census?

A. Iranian Census Bureau. Again, another Iranian case. The issues are very straightforward. How do you write up a questionnaire? First of all, what questions do you ask and how do you write up those questions? And how do you administrate a rather critical issue -- or set of issues -- in designing and marketing research? And, in this case, it's a marketing research of the largest possible scale -- you are asking everybody, every household, the same questions.

One of the people who had left the class in the previous session, during the discussion of the U.S. Trade Center case,

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raised his hand and said that he felt that this whole questionnaire was designed by the C.I.A. to get information on Iran. I'm familiar with the questionnaire. The questionnaire asks about the number of people in the household, the level of education (how many people could read, write), questions on the type of house they were living in, the type of services they had (water, electricity, telephone), if they owned or did not own certain items (such as television, radio), whether there were any handicappeds -- the kind of questions that any large bureaucracy, government bureaucracy, would be interested in, in planning for the future. Therefore, there was nothing that would indicate that these questions had any political overtones or objectives behind it.

Nonetheless, this fellow -- who was rather smart in other fields, not so much in marketing (he was a bit narrow-minded and inflexible), but I used to hear that he was very good in, for example, production (he always received high grades from Farshad Rafii) -- he raised his hand and said, "Well, this is a C.I.A.-sponsored and administered thing," and therefore there was nothing in it for the Iranian people. I was left flabbergasted the second time, having known this fellow a little bit.

But going back to that incident, people came to me after the first incident and apologized. And then they were really

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impressed by my decision, which I had made on the spot, that I would allow them to leave the classroom. So they thought that it was possible to disagree and be excused. Something that later on also happened, based on this first experience, a number of people left the classroom. This other time happened during Fati's....

Q. Etemad-Moghadam.

A. ...Etemad-Moghadam's session, where she was discussing a case on the Fifth Plan, and people -- this time a larger number, something like a third of the class, maybe twenty percent to a third of the class -- decided to leave. And she had also decided that if they left, they would be excused.

We also had days when the students would like to go and join certain -- this is post-hostage taking -- demonstrations in the street. But every time they had to make up for those classes, and they did, which reflected on their commitment to the cause.

Q. How would they make it up?

A. By meeting on Thursdays, if they left in the afternoon. If they left....

Q. The whole class would decide, in other words?

A. Well, this was the ... the class was, needless to say, a class of something like seventy people was not unanimous. If I want to divide the class, I would say something like ten percent were staunch revolutionaries, another fifteen percent to twenty percent were straight Taghoutis <former elite, people of the old regime> in their thinking: back to the former regime, not the Shah necessarily, but everything else. I think the class was unanimous that the Shah -- or a class of that character was unanimous -- that the Shah's departure was good for the country. And then there was a good seventy percent, two-thirds right in the middle, who could be swayed one way or the other -- the silent majority.

I must say, the Taghoutis were for the most part silent also; but when it came to voting, they voted completely to the other side from the revolutionaries. This two-thirds, depending on the issue, could sway the votes one way or the other. And the class went by the majority. If the majority of people decided on one type of action, they would go.

I must say that when they realized that they had to make up for the classes, and the making up of the classes was difficult because they had to meet on Thursday afternoons or meet on a given day for four classes instead of three, some of the revolutionary fever subsided -- at least insofar as

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joining.

G. So in other words, either the whole class would meet or wouldn't meet. The full number....

A. That's right. No, no, it was not. . . We had said that we would not meet with a small number of people and we would meet with the whole class. Therefore, the class would have to decide.

The class in its various political orientations had its own share of difficulty in reconciling one group's views with another, and how the different groups' views would be reflected in their attitudes and their posture towards the faculty. For example -- I may have indicated, talked about this when J.B. left -- there was a definite duality, polarity of views *<in>* the student body. One group, a smaller group, felt that J.B. should return; another similarly small group felt that he should not return; and something like, again, the two-thirds in the middle felt that his return or no-return was really not a very important issue.

The class had tried to meet post ... daily events ... after the last class, had tried to meet a number of times to decide on certain issues: elect, for example, a leader, a spokesman. Interestingly enough, the first spokesman elected was a revolutionary. But he was later asked to resign by the

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largest majority of the class, and then somebody who was not a revolutionary -- a former revolutionary but turned Taghouti -- was elected to be the class spokesman. The class had its own trials -- like everything else in the country was going through these purges and struggles of ideology and characters.

I must refer to one person, one specific student in the class who was a key figure among the revolutionaries, who had a major role to play in the class and outside the class. His name was Safi -- I cannot recall his first name -- we called him by his last name, Safi.

Q. S,A,F,I?

A. That's right. I interviewed the fellow when he was applying to ICMS. He impressed me in the interview as a guy who was a very shrewd son-of-a-bitch, who told me in his interview that after the uprisings in Tabriz, he had joined an American company in Esfahan to work. Once in the American company, he started to organize the ... that division that was under him (I think he was administering the whole services, the cafeteria services, the entertainment services of the ... I think it was the Bell Helicopter Company in Esfahan). He himself had a computer background from a computer school in Iran. But somehow, because of need for money and beginning of strikes, he couldn't find jobs

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somewhere else and he had joined this American company. But once inside the company, he started to organize the workers, organize the staff and he was very instrumental in closing down the company -- right before the revolution.

And I pushed him on this point, and I felt that he was a revolutionary who would only play that role when he felt that it was in his best personal or his own group interest. He was not going to be a martyr in that respect but he would be a very good organizer. As I say, he was -- I felt he was -- a shrewd son-of-a-bitch, which he came very true to be once joining ... after joining the class. I felt he was qualified, so I recommended admission and he was admitted.

He was a self-made man, coming from a lower income and he had made it, and I felt that he would be a good manager. He had the character of a good organizer, a man who can work with people, you know. At the time, we were not concerned about the ideology. Maybe if this ICMS had survived another year or two, maybe we would have taken that into account. But at the time, revolutionaries or no revolutionaries, if they were qualified, they would be admitted.

So, he was the first person who walked out of my class, so he established himself as a revolutionary. He was the first fellow elected to represent the class, because of his ability to impress his classmates with his revolutionary style and

his ability to be able to talk to the faculty. He was also the man who later we found out was organizing the workers.

Q. The school's workers?

A. The school's workers. He was the one who was putting words in their mouths when it came down to asking for ... demanding certain concessions from the faculty or from the administration of the school. He was the one who was writing all their posters. He was very true to this image we had begun to have of the people who would do anything to serve an ambiguous cause. In his case it was a leftist cause, he was a leftist; but somehow he was able to play the role of the Moslem organizer or Moslem revolutionary with the workers. He was well-accepted by these workers, who were, all of them, true Moslems -- practicing before, during, and after the revolution.

But again, he was skillful enough not to overdo it, so that he would not fall into the class of people who are disturbing the peace of ICMS and therefore be qualified to be kicked out. He's a character I guess I will remember for a long time -- I think all the faculty will remember for a long time. Not a likable character at all. Yet very effective in what he was doing. I wouldn't be surprised if he's holding a very important position today in the Iranian hierarchies.

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We also had a case -- this is, I must go back to pre-revolution, no, let's see, it was ... no, I think it was post-revolution -- another ... again, this was in the last class of ICMS. There was a fellow, who had come to us from, I think, Pahlavi, who had been kicked out from Pahlavi for political activities and then readmitted again -- who was also one of the first people who walked out of my class again. This fellow started to experience psychological problems in the first quarter of the school. This was affecting his performance in the classroom, but mixed in....

Mixed with this character was a very radical Islamic political ideology. So at the end of the first quarter it was very clear that among the people who had to leave -- I guess there were two -- one was this fellow, who, purely based on his grades, he wasn't going to make it.

So following the usual ICMS practice, we sent him a letter informing him that he was asked to leave the school, he was being asked to leave the school, and if he had any extenuating circumstances that he wanted to explain, he could come and explain. We knew at the time that the other colleagues of his, who were among that ten percent or so revolutionaries, were encouraging him that he should fight it. He was in a state, a psychological state that he was not willing to come and fight it. He was basically feeling that this was all part of a plan to get rid of him. He was

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developing a paranoid personality at the time -- it was very clear talking to us outside the classroom. So we were told that he would not apply for a second hearing.

Kasra <Ferdows> was there; he was heading the faculty council. He encouraged him, he sent people, messengers telling him that he should come: "Don't look for extenuating circumstances, we'd like to sit down and talk to you." Because we were very concerned that this whole action may be looked upon as a political decision, not an academic one. So he came. And he was most incoherent in his description. He read to us a letter which he had written to us, but he had not submitted to us. And his letter basically was ... it was just incoherent -- lots of things mixed up in there. Again, very strong Islamic ideology, and yet things that just didn't make sense. So we told him that our decision stays. And he left.

He came back about a week later during the recess. No, maybe it wasn't a week later, maybe he came back ... no, he came back later on. He came back maybe two or three months later. Apparently.... Let me explain. He came back, slept a night at the school -- by that time he had become friends with the guard, so the guard allowed him in -- slept a night at the school (even though school was in recess), woke up one morning, broke some window glasses -- panes. At that time he

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was chased by one of the guards. He fled leaving everything behind. We filed a complaint to the gendarmerie; gendarmerie came and wrote the whole description of what had happened.

But then it turned out that he had really flipped after leaving the school. I talked to his brother; by that time Karsra had left. I talked to his brother; his brother said he had ... this fellow was basically sleeping around on the streets. And I told him he really needed psychological, medical, help at that time. But this was another incident isolated from the rest.

Q. But where and how did the attacks against the school begin, its past, its connections? Was that mostly from the alumni or was that from the student body?

A. The student body.... Among that small group, it was critical of ICMS, of its past, but not so much that they would want to leave ICMS. In other words, they had a very difficult point to make. In fact they were against the entire ICMS idea, because they were there, they were suffering -- it was not exactly fun and games going through the ICMS, even in the last year. And therefore, in order to avoid us telling them, "But why are you here?" or "Why don't you leave?" they were critical of the past, but they were saying that ICMS was still a worthwhile venture.

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They were critical of the material that they were being fed. And some of the material was outdated. I mean, material on the Fifth Plan was outdated. And we were aware of it; the faculty was very conscious of this, very, in fact, apologetic. But we had told them that "This is the best we can do." They can always leave ICMS and come back three or four years afterwards, when we have more relevant material, but if they want to finish that year, this is all we could do. And they understood. I mean they were ... yes they would leave the classroom, they would protest, but they wouldn't do anything that would hurt their chances of getting through ICMS in that year.

The more critical evaluation of ICMS came from the alumni.

Q. So why don't you talk about the alumni?

A. Okay. I must again describe along the political ideology how the alumni ranked. There were something like a third of the alumni active revolutionaries. And when I say "active revolutionaries," I mean people who joined the revolution, who stayed with the revolution, who were contributing very actively to the cause of the revolution following ... in the years of '79 and '80. Okay. There was probably a third who had been personally affected negatively by the revolution, who had their ties with the former regime, who had suffered and who did not really like what was happening. And then the

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something like a third in between.

Among the first third, the revolutionary third, I would say something like, within that group, that segment, something like a third, maybe a half maximum, no more than half, were Islamic revolutionaries who had either had Islamic orientation before the revolution or who had adopted it following it. I would say, for example, Gavahi is a very good example of a man who had Islamic orientation before even coming to ICMS, that goes back seven, eight years. So that was no surprise -- being in that category.

A fellow like Mojaddam, who was not an Islamic fundamentalist by any definition, but had joined the ranks of the Islamic group, I would say he was of the other category.

Q. How about Rahimi?

A. Rahimi was a good case of the second category of people. A person who had political activity in the States, but been a member of the student confederation, Iranian student confederation in the States, but who was by no means a revolutionary, an Islamic revolutionary. People had seen him come to the Greek islands, and people had pictures of him holding a glass of whiskey in his hand, taking pictures, but ~~he~~ had joined the ranks of the Islamic revolutionaries. He had become truly a Moslem following the events of the

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revolution.

Q. Apparently he was extremely critical of ICMS, and its past, and so on.

A. He was a special character in the sense that I don't believe that he really truly believed in what he was saying. He was a man who had converted, and I think that all the psychological features of a new convert would apply in his case. He would recite things like a tape-recording.

Q. What would be the points that were mentioned?

A. That ICMS was an agent of influence for America, that ICMS had brought in American management techniques that were no longer applicable in Iran -- and they should not have even been imported from America. That certain figures associated with the school were traitors to the Iranian masses' interests.

Q. Does that mean the board of trustees, or the faculty too?

A. The board of trustees, the board of trustees. At the level of Rahimi, that stopped with the board of trustees.

But then we had another even more radical element -- maybe one or two, no more. At least I didn't see more, but there

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might have been, who felt that the faculty was also responsible for what had happened in the previous regime. That we should ... now that the revolution has taken place, we should now overhaul the school, make it Mardomi <popular>, or make it a popular school that would serve the cause of the masses and not the elite industrialists (who were no longer around, of course).

Q. Did they feel that the training that ICMS was continuing to give was not useful to students who would then go and work in the nationalized, or confiscated, or state enterprises?

A. They felt that that former training, and all the former material, should be, for the most part, thrown out because that would ... the material itself inculcated the students into thinking that the West had always the answer, that the U.S. had always the answer to key managerial problems. They were Iranian problems, they were not American problems. That we should start researching ways that ... solutions to problems that we would then teach in our classes as Iranian solutions.

I must say, in all of these criticisms nobody ever questioned the relevance and the appropriateness of the case method. Not one person. So the case method would stay but the material would change. And implied in that, of course, was

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that the people who write the material -- the faculty -- would also have to change their thinking. So indirectly we were attacked, but never directly, at least by the more prominent members of the alumni association, such as Gavahi, Rahimi, Soudabehri, Tavakoli -- whom, by the way, we organized into a group of interested alumni to help us, to (A) rewrite the whole charter of ICMS, because the former charter with the political changes was no longer relevant. We had to write a new one. But also help us in identifying where are the areas where we can make a major difference, a major improvement, in our curriculum.

Within that group, we also found a good vehicle in discussing future candidates for ICNS, future presidents of ICMS. For example, names such as Golzadeh Ghafouri or Chamran came out of these meetings. We also used this group, this core group -- I must say, when I say core group, there was always something like ten or twelve of them around. The membership changed; a few were steady ones, like Tavakoli, who, by the way, a young man....

Q. Ardehsir Tavakoli?

A. No, it's not Ardehsir Tavakoli, it's another Tavakoli -- I am sure his name was Tavakoli -- who had been a student a year or two before the revolution, maybe a year before the revolution. Who at the time we never felt he had any

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political or Islamic orientation. Who had become the <Persian> chief administrator of ... chief of administration in Bazargan's office. A very useful person. A young man, again, twenty-seven, maybe twenty-six, years old, who was genuinely sympathetic to our dilemma and our predicament, our faculty, and ICMS's situation.

He was one of the steady ones. Rahimi would come and go; Gavahi was very busy, would come maybe once. He came once and started this whole thing, gave everybody a lecture, because at the time everybody listened to him, including Soroushri and Rahimi. He basically would say something like: "We would like to preserve ICMS, maybe not every aspect of ICMS, but we would like to preserve ICMS. And we would like to help the faculty, the Iranian faculty, who are coming into the revolution, who are not members of the former industrialist class or regime, to do a better job."

So, you know, very good, very constructive attitudes. But then the other members would change, and some nights, some evenings, we would have very constructive groups -- somehow we would get together. And some nights new people would come in who would not be familiar with the discussion of the previous time and we had to basically retell the story and then we would not get too much done.

Q. Was <Fariborz> Khorouhi a member of the same group? Or

was that another...?

A. No, Khoroushi was a member of the same group. Khoroushi was a member of the same group. He was, again, one of the steady ones. His job, his role, was not to play an Islamic revolutionary role or even a revolutionary role. His role basically was to bring down ... most of the revolutionary slogans down to earth and to say, "Well, this is the reality, how do you want to do it?" And in that respect was very helpful to the faculty.

He was somebody we would turn to before the meetings and say, "Look, this is one problem we're going to face here. These are suggestions that will be made. We are the faculty, we have a vested interest -- at least we could be perceived to have a vested interest -- in ICMS, even though we felt that we could have jobs other places outside of Iran. We could be considered trying to preserve ICMS and therefore preserve our jobs. Why don't you raise this point?" And he would do that, he would do it very effectively. He, and one or two other members of his own class he knew very well, they would come.

So, criticisms were never really harsh criticism as such; at least I never felt -- by this group. There was always somebody who would moderate.

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We had, on three or four occasions, one single person who would attack ICMS from its foundation up, who would attack individual members of the faculty, who called everybody a traitor and somebody who should be rehabilitated. He was a rarity; he caused a lot of pain to two of the members of the faculty. He caused a lot of pain to the members of the revolutionary group because he was always an embarrassment to them -- he had to be contained. Not by us. Towards the end, we had learned that the best way to deal with this fellow was to sit back and listen to him. Sooner or later somebody from the more respectable revolutionary group would come and say, "Well, it's time for you to shut up because you've said too much and...."

And his orientation was not clear because he was not exactly a Moslem, he was not exactly a true-blooded Communist. I think he was some kind of an anarchist, it looked like -- he wanted to destroy. And then he would say, "Well, why don't you stop doing what you're doing, today, ICMS? Close the doors, just go out into the masses and learn." And then he would advise us that we should all, before doing that, we should all get down on our knees and repent and ask the forgiveness of the Iranian masses. He was that kind of a character.

Q. But do I understand you correctly that there was no really mass opinion among the alumni and students that ICMS

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... there was something wrong basically with ICMS, that it was US-inspired or CIA-inspired or was...?

A. No, not as a mass. At least, not the ones that we would see. We asked the members of the alumni to come to the school -- we invited them. This happened during Kasra's tenure, the first meeting we had. We wanted to get them involved, because we felt that Kasra was about to leave. We had no president. We were a yatim.

Q. Orphan.

A. An orphan. And our strongest, most powerful constituency -- and the only one -- was our alumni, because the industrialists had left, the former regime had left. The board of trustees, every member as far as I knew, was out. We had been basically left with one constituency outside, and that was the alumni. And we felt it was up to us to organize them because they were not going to organize themselves.

Q. You were speaking about the bad image of the school and perhaps an effort that could have been made to present a truer image of the school. And we could talk about that. What were you referring to? What was the bad image of the school and among whom was this bad image?

A. Okay. We ... I now feel that we could have done a better

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public relations job during our seven or eight years of existence as an institution. We had been known as the best, the toughest, and the most expensive -- and therefore the most elitist -- institution of higher education in the country. And we were all of those. We were all of those. Now this is, I think, our liability; that was our liability at the time.

Our assets were not known: that we had, first of all, an Iranian faculty increasingly taking over; that we had material -- that we had done research in Iran that no other institution had done, had even thought of doing in Iran.

Q. Iranian cases?

A. Iranian cases. Based on the genuine Iranian problems. That we were not a branch of Harvard. That the things we taught at ICMS would have never been taught at Harvard -- a very large part of it -- because they were not relevant to the American problems, whereas they would be relevant to Iranian problems. That the Iranian faculty were the most up-to-date of all the scholars as to what was happening in Iran. That our being expensive was a reflection not of high profits -- the school was never a surplus institution anyway -- was a reflection of how much it cost to maintain an institution of higher learning of that caliber.

Q. And small numbers.

A. It was a reflection of the small numbers of people that we took in. Because we did not want to open up a mass assembly kind of a job workshop, we wanted to select the best who would carry our message for better education, better management, who outside would be good ambassadors for ICMS. That the true cost of education was not borne by the individuals themselves, but by the people who hired them later on. Because what really was happening was that the higher cost of education at our school, the first ... the year that they had to pay the tuition and they would not be earning salaries, would be more than compensated in the first few months of their employment following their graduation. And they would be paying back their loans over a comfortable two or three years' period of time. An engineer who was getting something around five thousand tomans at the time of coming to ICMS would be receiving easily fifteen thousand tomans....

Q. One year later.

A. One year later. And his tuition and all the unearned salary during the year that he was at ICMS would be a six months' salary following his graduation. So, ... and who was bearing that? It was the industrialists, the companies. So, that, people didn't know -- or that, and all the other

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things. The good sides of ICMS people did not know.

I was often asked, "How many hours do you teach at ICMS?" And I would say, "Well, on a typical week when I'm teaching, I'm teaching about five, six hours. But I'm not teaching all year round, I'm only teaching about three-quarters of a year." And people's mouths would <be> wide open: "What do you do with the rest of your time?" Well, ICMS was not exactly a madreseh-e alil-e bazargani <business college> -- another school. We spent a lot of time doing the kinds of things that would make sense in the classroom the following year. We'd create a genuinely Iranian ... relevant material for our program, for our curriculum.

So, those were the kinds of things that I think we could have emphasized before, so that when people came back to us after the revolution, <they> wouldn't tell us, "Oh, you are the Harvard school." Well, we had our Harvard association; we built on that initially. But then towards the end we wanted to stay away from that association as much as possible, because we felt that by that time we had achieved a certain respectability. But I think we could have done probably a better job in disassociating ourselves from Harvard.

Q. What was the problem of being associated with Harvard ... in that context?

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A. Well, there were several problems. First, Harvard was an American institution. Harvard was also an institution which had given either the Shah or Ashraf....

Q. The Shah -- a doctorate.

A. A doctorate, an honorary doctorate. People remembered these things. And even though Harvard is also known as one of the best institutions of research, learning, scholarship around the world, when it comes to Iran, looked on from Iranian point of view, it was an institution which was, first of all, an American institution. And people would always wonder why an American institution would want to open up a store in Iran, if it were really a branch of Harvard. And therefore, the only reason they would want to open up a branch, a store, in Iran was not to help Iran but to help America -- so this was kind of a rationale behind their thinking.

But obviously we were not a Harvard branch. And we were a school designed, organized, administered by Iranians. We had an academic head from Harvard, who was also the president; but he was really more of an academic head than the president, because the administrative side was being run by Dr. Ladjevardi for the most part. So, that was what was wrong with the Harvard association.

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And then people would come back after the revolution and would say, "Well, the school should not be an American school." Now we had to correct our first-year alumni, because they were the ones who had the most American education -- of all the seven or eight years.

Q. Because there were no Iranian cases then.

A. At the time. We were just beginning to develop some Iranian cases. So we had to point out to them that something like a third of the material, towards the end, as it was in most courses, was Iranian. In some courses it was even more, such as the economic development course.

Q. Is it true that some of the alumni had said, "We were brainwashed here"?

A. "We" meaning...?

Q. The school, ICMS, the curriculum "brainwashed us."

A. I think I heard that, I don't recall who was saying that. It could have well come from this fellow I was referring to, the nut. He certainly had problems.

Q. I was told that Rahimi had said that.

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A. Brainwashed? I did not hear Rahimi say that.